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The racially disproportionate nature of the drug war is not just devastating to [B]lack Americans. It contradicts faith in the principles of
justice and equal protection of the laws that should be the bedrock of
any constitutional democracy; it exposes and deepens the racial fault
lines that continue to weaken the country and belies its promise as the
land of equal opportunity; and it undermines faith among all races in
the fairness and efficacy of the criminal justice system. Urgent action
is needed, at both the state and federal level, to address this crisis for
the American nation.1

INTRODUCTION
There may be no greater disaster in the development of criminal
justice legislation and policy than the sentencing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine. Under federal drug laws, selling 1,000
grams of powder cocaine gets the same mandatory ten-year sentence
as selling ten grams of crack cocaine. Powder cocaine is more likely to
be consumed by White drug offenders, while crack cocaine is more
likely to be consumed by Black offenders. The result has been an
explosion in the federal prison population, particularly among Black
prisoners. This phenomenon and its unfortunate consequences are
known as racialized mass imprisonment. Its permanence and growth
mocks and threatens the legitimacy of the American legal system and
is at the center of a host of social ills affecting communities throughout the country.
Racialized mass imprisonment is a social, economic, and political
process spurred by draconian anti-drug abuse sentencing legislation
that simultaneously impacts the viability of the Black community, the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, and the health of American
democracy. While conventional wisdom holds that people who commit crimes must “do the time,” the definition of crime and the principles buttressing conceptions of appropriate sentencing are not neutral
or objective factors. History and contemporary politics reveal that
popular conceptions of crime, punishment, and justice are shifting and
unstable political constructs that reflect broader patterns of power and
subordination in society. The stubborn, protracted racial struggles endemic to American society only complicate this. The politics of race
in the post-segregation era, however, often obscure the ways in which
the processes of racial subjugation have changed or remain un1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on
Drugs (2000).
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changed. Post-segregation-era society is defined not only by its misguided and naı̈ve colorblind ambitions, but also by its determination
to forget, obscure, and de-politicize America’s racial past. This tenuous myth of race neutrality, however, is easily unraveled when mass
incarceration is examined in its proper social, political, and historical
context.
The relationship between race and incarceration needs little introduction.2 The seriousness and enormity of the problems racialized
mass imprisonment presents, however, go beyond the unprecedented
numbers of men and women of color warehoused in state and federal
penal institutions. It encompasses more than narrow conceptions of
crime and punishment and has disastrous consequences for Black
communities and all of American society. Racialized mass imprisonment affects such broad socio-economic factors as labor force participation, political power, family organization, education, marriage rates,
and public health.
At the core of the public policy driving racialized mass imprisonment are the crack laws—the body of legislation passed through the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 19863 and the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988.4 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 introduced
mandatory minimum penalties for the possession and distribution of
crack cocaine, and established sentencing requirements 100 times

2. A considerable body of literature interrogating the links between incarceration and race
exists. See, e.g., Theodore G. Chiricos & Charles Crawford, Race and Imprisonment: A Contextual Assessment of the Evidence, in ETHNICITY, RACE, AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVES ACROSS TIME
AND PLACE 281-309 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1995) (reviewing the empirical evidence of racial
bias in the decision to incarcerate); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-62, 132-57 (1999) (discussing racial profiling, police
brutality, and the politics and policy of mass incarceration); BAKARI KITWANA, THE HIP HOP
GENERATION: YOUNG BLACKS AND THE CRISIS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN CULTURE 51-84 (2002)
(discussing the impact of racialized mass imprisonment on the hip-hop generation); MANNING
MARABLE, THE GREAT WELLS OF DEMOCRACY: THE MEANING OF RACE IN AMERICAN LIFE
147-164 (2002) [hereinafter GREAT WELLS] (discussing the political dimensions of mass imprisonment in the Black community); MANNING MARABLE, HOW CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED
BLACK AMERICA 105-32 (2000) [hereinafter CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED] (discussing the
history of racialized mass imprisonment and the economic aspects of its theory and methods);
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed., 2001) (covering several dimensions of mass imprisonment and its relationship to larger patterns and
processes of economic, racial, and political struggle); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE
(1999).
3. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841
(2004)).
4. The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4390 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(l) (2004)).
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greater than similar sentencing penalties for powder cocaine.5 The
1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act extended these penalties to the charge of
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine.6 As a result, these laws impose
a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for crimes involving five
grams of crack, while possession of 500 grams of cocaine is necessary
to trigger the same sentence. This tremendous disparity between the
sentencing for crack and powder cocaine offenses—different forms of
the same drug stereotypically associated with poor Blacks and middle
to upper-income Whites, respectively—has been the subject of considerable controversy since the Act’s passage. Such a wide sentencing
disparity has led to a distinct and unprecedented racialized explosion
in the American prison population.7
Legal challenges to the crack laws have focused primarily on their
equal protection implications; however, the courts have consistently
denied relief.8 In denying these equal protection claims, courts routinely rely on the Supreme Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis.9
In Davis, Black candidates challenged the racially discriminatory effects of the Washington, D.C., Police Department’s facially neutral
hiring exam, Test 21. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution
does not prohibit unintentional acts of discrimination that have racially disparate impacts.10 This principle is now known as the intent
requirement and has emerged as a formidable judicial standard for
adjudicating cases involving discriminatory effects arising from seemingly innocuous legislation. By upholding the constitutionality of the
crack laws, the intent requirement has, in many ways, functioned as
the jurisprudential anchor for a system of racialized mass imprison5. Compare § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (Anyone in possession of “5 kilograms or more of a . . .
a detectable amount of . . . cocaine . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may
not be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury results . . . not less
than 20 years . . . .”) with § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Anyone in possession of “50 grams or more of a
mixture or substance described in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base . . . shall be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more . . . .”).
6. See Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
7. See, e.g., MAUER, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]he national prison population [has] risen 500
percent since 1972 . . . in the ten-year period beginning in 1985, federal and state governments
had opened a new prison a week to cope with the flood of prisoners.”).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 258 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Thomas, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11899 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Banks, 130 F.3d 621, 626
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Stevens,
19 F.3d 93, 96-7 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d
623 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1990).
9. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
10. See id. at 238-48.
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ment that, in the post-segregation era, has replaced Jim Crow as the
literal and symbolic tool of Black subjugation.11
The intent requirement of Davis has spawned a considerable
body of progressive, critical legal scholarship and journalism.12 Perhaps the most renowned criticism of the Davis intent requirement is
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism by Charles Lawrence.13 Lawrence presents a cultural meaning
test that questions the focus of the intent requirement by placing the
intent inquiry into its proper historical and social context.14
There remains, however, a link between racialized mass imprisonment and the intent requirement of Davis scarcely explored in discussions about either issue. Racialized mass imprisonment is typically
seen as a byproduct of the war on drugs and racism. Discussion of the
crack laws, particularly in legal scholarship, reached its peak in the
mid to late 1990s, and has largely subsided.15 The intent requirement
of Davis is typically viewed relative to issues of judicial review16 and,
11. See generally Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and
Mesh, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 2, at 82-120
(discussing the links between slavery, Jim Crow, the ghetto, and prisons).
12. See, e.g., Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Yoav Sapir,
Neither Intent Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence
and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127 (2003); Reshma M. Saujani, The Implicit Association Test: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8
MICH. J. RACE & L. 395 (2003); Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the Text of the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Definition of “Equal” Requires a Disproportionate Impact Analysis When
Laws Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 95-97 (2002).
13. Lawrence, supra note 12.
14. See id. at 355-81.
15. See, e.g., Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy Following the 1995
Cocaine Report: Issues of Fairness and Just Punishment, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 347 (1998); David
A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995); William Spade,
Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
1233 (1996); Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40
VILL. L. REV. 335 (1995); Cristian M. Stevens, Criticism of Crack Cocaine Sentences Is Not What
It Is Cracked Up To Be: A Case of First Impression Within the Ongoing Crack vs. Cocaine Debate, 62 MO. L. REV. 869 (1997); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1795 (1998).
16. Most of the discourse on Davis and the intent requirement has focused on the issue of
judicial review. The concern of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, however, is
with equality rather than judicial review. The discussion of Davis and the intent requirement
reveals this fundamental breakdown in the law’s ability to realize the Constitution’s broad and
deep potential for bringing about true equality. Realizing this potential requires a historical
approach to both understanding the equal protection clause and, more specifically, the context
surrounding the Davis Court. The latter consideration requires a departure from the traditional
legal-theoretical approach to one of political theory and history.
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more broadly, post-segregation-era developments in the direction and
scope of anti-discrimination jurisprudence. In the 1990s, the intent requirement and racialized mass imprisonment intersected in the legal
battles challenging the constitutionality of the crack laws. During
these struggles, the intent requirement emerged as a mechanism for
preserving an adapted post-Jim Crow racial logic fashioned for the
contemporary terrain of race, crime, and punishment. It is, therefore,
necessary to trace the common history of racialized mass imprisonment and the intent requirement—a process that will reveal Davis’s
essential role in perpetuating Black subjugation in the post-segregation era.
This Article endeavors to chronicle the history of Davis and
racialized mass imprisonment in a way that shows the connections between the politics behind the construction of law—in both public policy and common law—and social developments commonly understood
as tangential to constitutional interpretation as opposed to both the
impetus for and the intended result of certain modes of constitutional
interpretation. The historical record, when viewed in this regard, is
not merely a sequential chain of events occurring alongside the development of constitutional interpretation. Instead, the record details a
long-standing logic, at times deployed to protect entrenched racial and
class power by masquerading it as a legitimate framework of constitutional analysis.
The Davis decision will be chronicled and analyzed for its role in
maintaining pre-existing patterns of racialized power and privilege
across American society’s transition from a regime of formal and substantive inequality (Jim Crow) to one of formal, facial equality, but
persistent, substantive inequality (racialized mass imprisonment).17
This analysis hinges on reviewing the development of race politics, the
Supreme Court, and social policy in the immediate post-segregation
era. This analysis reveals that the intent requirement established in
Davis is evidence of conscious judicial activism aimed at creating a
very specific and indelible roadblock to racial progress in the postsegregation era, thus severely limiting a quarter century of anti-discrimination law in the courts. These calculations formed the fertile
17. For a discussion on how racialized mass imprisonment imposes the same burdens and
stigmas as a system of Jim Crow laws or any other method of racial subjugation, see David Cole,
The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment On Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction,” 83
GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995) and Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994).
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ground for the logic of the crack laws, while simultaneously giving
them, and other racist legislation and state action, cover from equal
protection attacks.
Before investigating the concurrent historical forces that led up to
the intent requirement and the growth of racialized mass imprisonment, the Davis decision must be understood in relation to its impact
on anti-discrimination law and the cyclical nature of race struggles in
American society. Part I of this Article presents the seldom discussed
similarities between the decision in Davis and the decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson.18 Specifically, Part I frames the discussion of the intent requirement and racialized mass imprisonment by paralleling the political work the Plessy decision performs with that of the Davis decision.
Part I concludes with an analysis of the Davis decision.
Part II seeks to connect several developments that, while occurring simultaneously in the immediate post-segregation era, are rarely
thought of as interrelated in legal analyses of either the intent requirement or racialized mass imprisonment. The analysis begins with a
presentation of the political climate surrounding the 1968 presidential
election and President Richard Nixon’s appointments to the Supreme
Court. It continues by exploring the Court’s consciousness in purposefully bringing about a transformation in the reach and scope of
anti-discrimination law and policy. Part II also follows the development of a post-segregation-era theory of social control that resulted in
the War on Drugs of the 1980s and 1990s. Part II concludes by contemplating racialized mass imprisonment as a modified method of racial subjugation.
Part III examines the recent legal struggles that challenged the
constitutionality of the crack laws on equal protection grounds and
the response of the courts. Specifically, Part III revisits the first federal case that found the crack laws in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and the logic the appellate court used to reverse the decision
and uphold the laws’ constitutionality. The courts’ decisions on these
issues provide the clearest illustration of the conscious and unconscious racial motives driving the contemporary understanding of race
and interpretations of the intent requirement.

18. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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I. RACIAL REDUX: DAVIS AND PLESSY IN CONTEXT
In order to understand the unique relationship between the intent
requirement of Davis and the crack laws, Davis must be situated
within its proper historical context. Given the functions that the intent requirement performs relative to racialized mass imprisonment in
the post-segregation era, Davis is best likened to the historic case,
Plessy v. Ferguson.19 In this case, Homer Plessy, a Black man, argued
that Louisiana’s Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.20 The Act segregated railroad passengers to separate cars based on race. Plessy lost the case,
and through its decision, the Supreme Court made “separate but
equal” the law of the land.21 Moreover, the decision in Plessy occurred during the aftermath of several ineffective legislative attempts
to retain the manner in which White supremacy limited the civil rights
and liberties of Blacks nationwide, specifically the passage of the Thirteenth,22 Fourteenth,23 and Fifteenth24 Amendments to the Constitu-

19. Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
20. See generally id. at 540-41.
21. See id. at 544.
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to
be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency
of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for White and
colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power
even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have been longest
and most earnestly enforced.
Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
23. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
24. Id. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”).
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tion, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,25 and the Civil Rights Acts of 18701875.26
In the years following emancipation, Blacks ascended to public
office, acquired private property, founded colleges and universities,
and voted in elections.27 These and other developments were the result of Black self-determination and ingenuity in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. The expectations these rapid achievements
engendered in Black society inevitably clashed with an impoverished,
embittered, and embarrassed southern White populace. Jim Crow
was White society’s response to the very aggressive demands Blacks
were making for substantive equality. Plessy came on the heels of
these developments with the explicit intent of rationalizing the backlash and constitutionalizing the growth of Jim Crow.28 Similarly, Davis followed a series of legislative enactments and socio-political shifts
that instantly removed judicial sanction and constitutional support for

25. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
The Civil Rights Act (1866) was passed by Congress on 9th April 1866 over the veto of
President Andrew Johnson. The act declared that all persons born in the United States
were now citizens, without regard to race, color, or previous condition. As citizens they
could make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. Persons who denied
these rights to former slaves were guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction faced a
fine not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAcivil1866.htm (last visited Feb.
21, 2007).
26. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
The essence of the [Civil Rights Act of 1875] is not to declare broadly that all persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and theatres; but that such enjoyment shall not be subject to any conditions applicable only to citizens of a particular
race or color, or who had been in a previous condition of servitude. In other words, it is
the purpose of the law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommodations and
privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places of public amusement,
no distinction shall be made between citizens of different race or color, or between
those who have, and those who have not, been slaves. Its effect is to declare, that in all
inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement, colored citizens, whether formerly
slaves or not, and citizens of other races, shall have the same accommodations and
privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement as are enjoyed by
White citizens; and vice versa. The second section makes it a penal offence in any
person to deny to any citizen of any race or color, regardless of previous servitude, any
of the accommodations or privileges mentioned in the first section.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9-10; id. at 16 (“[T]he ‘Civil Rights Bill,’ originally passed
April 9, 1866, and re-enacted with some modifications in sections 16, 17, 18, of the Enforcement
Act, passed May 31, 1870.”); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 40-46 (2004).
27. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 26, at 46.
28. See, e.g., Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in Anti-discrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 103-22 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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Jim Crow. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968,29 the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,30 and the racially progressive developments they
promised constituted a second reconstruction and laid the groundwork for the movement of Blacks into the American mainstream.
Though substantively different, the timeline of events surrounding both Plessy and Davis proceeds as follows: a major social upheaval
forever alters the balance of racial power and the status of Blacks;
organized mass action influences legislation and social developments
that solidify a new social order; a backlash develops that quickly
adapts its modus-operandi to the new racial discourse and conventional wisdom; political and legal contests reflecting the tension between the new social order and the backlash increase in number and
intensify; the Supreme Court intervenes to settle the tension; and finally, new arrangements, masked as compromise, constrain the potential of the initial social upheavals and restore what is left of the
previous social arrangement. This life cycle nurtures both Plessy and
Davis. In both cases, it is the period immediately after this process
that is most detrimental to racial progress.
A. Davis and Plessy
Introducing the parallels between Davis and Plessy allows the
Davis decision to be cast against a set of historical processes that are
cyclical in nature. American history is replete with examples of different groups of Whites, embroiled in conflict over the meaning and status of race, who settle a dispute and establish or reestablish amicable
relations by striking compromises that conflict with the interests of
Blacks.31 For instance, the question of whether slavery would expand
into the free states was a highly contested issue, with Whites in the
Free Land Movement calling for the abolishment of slavery in the new
29. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2000)); The Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as 42
U.S.C.S. § 3601 (2004)).
30. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2004)).
31. See BELL, supra note 26, at 37.
In the main, poor Whites in the seventeenth century were ready to trade their economic demands for racism, and even two hundred years later in the post-Civil War
period, the efforts of some leaders of the Populist Party to unite poor Southern
[W]hites and [B]lacks against the ruling Bourbons were shattered by the continued
inability of poor [W]hites to surrender racism even for responsive political power.
Their susceptibility had not lessened midway through the twentieth century, as Dr.
Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference discovered during the
1968 Poor People’s Campaign.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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states and territories.32 The issue partly revolved around the fact that
poor and working class Whites simply could not compete with free
Black labor. Allowing White elites and industrialists to bring slaves
into the new states rendered opportunities for the White poor and
working class virtually non-existent. The Scott v. Sandford33 decision
ultimately settled this issue and temporarily bolstered the power of
southern White slaveholders.34 The decision divided the nation and
was one of the primary drivers of Southern secession, thrusting the
nation into the Civil War.35 Once the war was over, the newly freed
Black population rapidly asserted its citizenship in all areas of society.
The 1877 Hayes-Tilden Compromise,36 however, saw the convergence
of Northern and Southern White interests in restoring White
supremacy in the South and opening new markets for Northern industrialists.37 This reconciliation was solidified less than ten years later in
Plessy.38
The rapid social, political, and economic ascension of Blacks in
the years between the end of the Civil War and Plessy increased economic competition in the poor and working classes and dramatically
altered existing social arrangements. Similarly, the period following
the demise of Jim Crow, but before the Davis decision, saw Blacks
making new demands for substantive equality. Just as during Reconstruction, White supremacy was strong and virulently opposed to
32. See generally Bill Cecil-Fronsman, Advocate the Freedom of White Men, as Well as that
of Negroes: The Kansas Free State and Antislavery Westerners in Territorial Kansas, 20 KAN.
HIST., Summer 1997, at 102.
33. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
34. Id. at 404-05.
The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to
be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution, and can therefore claim
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant
race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had
no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them.
Id.
35. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-PRESENT
167-205 (1995).
36. See generally BELL, supra note 26, at 37-39 (discussing the 1876 Hayes-Tilden Presidential election and the deal struck between Democrats and Republicans, which brought about the
removal of U.S. troops from the South, effectively ending Reconstruction and clearing the way
for the development of Jim Crow); see also ZINN, supra note 35, at 200 (discussing the 1877
compromise and the reconciliation of Southern and Northern elites).
37. See generally BELL, supra note 26, at 37-39.
38. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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many dimensions of the new social order. The post-segregation-era
opposition to school integration and the rise in claims of reverse discrimination in response to affirmative action signaled a coming convergence of interests among disparate groups of Whites: (1) the liberal
integrationists, many of them elites, who saw the end of Jim Crow
necessary for global and domestic capitalistic expansion39 and (2) the
White working and poor classes who clung to Whiteness, their only
claim to status and privilege, in the face of the encroaching demands
of the Black community.40 Like Plessy, decided almost a century
before, Davis came on the heels of these developments with the explicit intent of rationalizing the backlash to these developments and
restraining the Constitution’s ability to intervene in the post-segregation era’s racial conflicts.
The effects of Plessy cannot be directly correlated with those of
Davis, but relative to their respective location in the historical development of race in America, the two decisions perform some of the
same work in four important ways. First, the rationale of the Davis
intent requirement denies the purpose behind racialized mass imprisonment in the same manner Plessy denied the purpose behind Jim
Crow. Second, both decisions deny the stigma attached to Blacks
through the process and consequences of segregation and racialized
mass imprisonment. The decisions also attempt to rationalize the popular backlash to racial progress in their respective periods. Third,
both decisions intentionally seek to dehistoricize and depoliticize
these systems, dislodging them from their rightful positions in a continuing process of racial subjugation. Lastly, both cases anticipate the
potential directions of anti-discrimination law at their respective mo39. See, e.g., ADOLPH REED, JR., STIRRINGS IN THE JUG: BLACK POLITICS IN THE POSTSEGREGATION ERA 63 (1999).
The alliance of corporate liberalism and Black protest was evident in the aggressive
endorsement of civil rights activity that was mobilized by the New Deal coalition. Major labor organizations and enlightened corporate elements immediately climbed
aboard the freedom train through the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and
private foundations.
Id.
To the extent that it blocked individual aspirations, segregation was seen as artificially
restricting social growth and progress. Similarly, by raising artificial barriers, such as
the constriction of Blacks’ consumer power through Jim Crow legislation and indirectly
through low Black wages, segregation impeded, so the argument went, the free functioning of the market.
See id. at 64.
40. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and The Interest Convergence
Dilemma, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
supra note 20, at 20-29.
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ments; specifically, the potential for large-scale political and economic
realignment.
Like Plessy, the logic of Davis had to acknowledge the racial progress made to date, while simultaneously constructing race-neutral
principles out of grossly discriminatory and oppressive situations.
Reconciling these aims required not just an indifference to the reality
of race relations in 1896 or 1976, but it also required a reconstruction
of that reality in a colorblind manner that dehistoricized the competing claims of liberty made by White and Black communities in a
racialized society. For instance, the Plessy Court is explicit about its
rationalizations of the discrimination brought on by Jim Crow laws.
The Court boldly states,
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. . . .
The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome
by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the Negro
except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot
accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of
social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual
appreciation of each other’s merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals.41

Likewise, the Davis Court is historically blind and politically naı̈ve in its consideration of the efficacy of race-neutral statutes in settings where race has historically been an issue and, in the immediate
post-segregation era, is the issue.
The test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said to serve a
purpose the Government is constitutionally empowered to pursue.
Even agreeing with the District Court that the differential racial effect of Test 21 called for further inquiry, we think the District Court
correctly held that the affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police
Department to recruit Black officers, the changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference
that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that “a
police officer qualifies on the color of his skin rather than ability.”42
41. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
42. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976). But see id. at 270 (Brennan, J.
dissenting).

2007]

357

Howard Law Journal
Both Plessy and Davis reflect the concerns that the natural course
of the social upheavals of the 1860s and the 1960s, respectively, would
lead to sweeping alterations in the balance of power and privilege
upon which American society depended. The threat of Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement lay not just in their potential for
transforming the landscape of race relations in the country, but also in
their natural connections to larger movements for social justice and
more substantive economic and political realignments.43 This is the
impetus behind the Davis Court’s concern for the “parade of horribles” that disparate impact claims could produce.44 Consequently,
both the Plessy and Davis decisions find the Court aggressively defining the legal meaning of racial discrimination, so as to shift the constitutional understanding of race at the time.
It is highly unlikely that when deciding Davis in 1976, ten years
before the passage of the crack laws, the Court foresaw the crack laws
and designed the intent requirement in Davis to defend such injustice.
Taking such a position is unnecessary to make the point at hand. The
Court’s decision to craft the intent requirement in Davis must be considered relative to the trajectory of the Court’s historic role in racial
justice. The era of anti-discrimination law, initiated by Brown v.
Board of Education,45 coincided with various movements for social
change, upheaval, and revolution in America and throughout the
world. The policy and social reforms accomplished by the time of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s, assassination in 1968 ushered in new social
Sound policy considerations support the view that, at a minimum, petitioners should
have been required to prove that the police training examinations either measure jobrelated skills or predict job performance. Where employers try to validate written qualification tests by proving a correlation with written examinations in a training course,
there is a substantial danger that people who have good verbal skills will achieve high
scores on both tests due to verbal ability, rather than job-specific ability. As a result,
employers could validate any entrance examination that measures only verbal ability by
giving another written test that measures verbal ability at the end of a training course.
Any contention that the resulting correlation between examination scores would be
evidence that the initial test is job related is plainly erroneous. It seems to me, however, that the Court’s holding in this case can be read as endorsing this dubious
proposition.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
43. See, e.g., JACK M. BLOOM, CLASS, RACE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1987).
44. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate,
a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may
be more burdensome to the poor and to the average [B]lack than to the more affluent
[W]hite.
Id.
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and political arrangements, effectively ending Jim Crow. The path set
out by these movements brought into question structures of power
and privilege deeply ingrained in the American social fabric. Antidiscrimination law was poised to continue fighting these constructs.
Those in power were aware.46
By the 1970s, racism was a dirty word and Americans were slowly
becoming self-conscious of being labeled as racist, even if their social
behavior and political choices suggested otherwise. With overt racial
discrimination no longer fashionable in the formal language of public
policy, discriminatory intent would now be practically impossible to
find except through an examination of policy outcomes via a disparate
impact analysis. The intent requirement of Davis severely limits such
an analysis. Therefore, the Davis decision effectively transitions between one era of subjugation, Jim Crow apartheid, to another, racialized mass imprisonment. By providing the legal underpinning and
justification for a range of facially neutral yet invidiously racist laws—
most notably the crack laws—the Davis intent requirement has
emerged as an essential pillar to the maintenance of a new regime of
subjugation.
In the same manner that Plessy provided a blueprint for racists to
structure the formal contours of the Jim Crow system, Davis empowered modern-day policy makers to devise the logic, craft the legislation, and enforce the policies that could mask racial and
discriminatory intent behind a façade of objectivity. By anticipating
the likely progression of anti-discrimination law in both periods,
Plessy and Davis illustrate the Court’s conscious construction of a rationale for balancing racial power. Davis functions as a blueprint for
the creation of new laws and policies that reproduce existing hierarchies and inequalities, while appearing to rest on neutral and objective
(non-racial) principles. Making the connection between Davis and
Plessy helps to clarify the continuity of the racialized thinking out of
which both decisions arise.
B. The Davis Decision and the Challenges to the Crack Laws
In Davis, the Court held that a job qualifications examination
given by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
did not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race under either constitutional or statutory standards, despite the fact that the test had a
46. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 12.
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disparate impact on the hiring of Black officers.47 The Court held that
only facial or intentional discrimination was subject to strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis and that even if a policy had a disparate racial effect, it must be upheld if: (1) the policy was race-neutral
on its face; and (2) the policy served a legitimate public function.48
The Court also cited a “slippery slope” concern; the adoption of a
disparate impact analysis, the Court argued, would call into question a
wide variety of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that have disparate impacts on minorities and other groups.49
At the time the Davis decision was rendered, it stood in stark
contrast to an earlier precedent that dealt with race discrimination in
employment. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,50 the Court held that a
facially neutral employment requirement that served to discriminate
against Blacks was impermissible.51 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Griggs, in part, to resolve whether an employment criterion
was constitutional when it operated to exclude Blacks from employment.52 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous court, commented on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act stating, “Congress
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation.”53 Therefore, the Davis Court,
five years after Griggs, was forced to make an illogical distinction between its statutory jurisprudence, Title VII barring racial discrimination in employment and its constitutional jurisprudence, the Equal
Protection Clause barring racial discrimination.

47. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny
and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 248; see also BELL, supra note 26, at 661-87.
50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
51. See id. at 430 (stating “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices”).
52. See id. at 425-26.
53. See id. at 431.
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Davis was followed and reinforced by the Court’s decision in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney54 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.55 In
Feeney, a sex discrimination case, the Court rejected a claim for a
heightened standard of review whenever the foreseeable impact of a
governmental action was to place a protected class at a disadvantage.56 In Arlington Heights, a zoning ordinance was challenged on
the grounds that it was racially discriminatory. The Court used the
Davis intent standard to decide the case, recognizing that historical
factors could be taken into consideration when finding evidence of
discriminatory intent, but ultimately requiring that a discriminatory
purpose be a motivating factor in the zoning scheme for it to be unconstitutional.57 Both decisions weakened the fleeting gains of the
Civil Rights Movement and rationalized the growing backlash to social change. Through its application in subsequent cases, Davis’s logic
quickly became normalized in anti-discrimination cases.58
The Davis Court makes a textualist separation of powers argument for avoiding a disparate impact analysis, while undermining its
previous holdings that adhered to a textualist interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause in order to find disparate impact evidence of
discriminatory intent.59 The Davis Court recognizes that a disparate
54. 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (holding that “even if a neutral law has a disproportionately
adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause
only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose”).
55. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
56. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256. For a discussion of the impact of Davis and Feeney, see EARL
M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969-1986, at 190-91 (2000).
57. See 429 U.S. at 266-67 (1977).
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may
be available. The impact of the official action whether it bears more heavily on one
race than another . . . may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face . . . . The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark
as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must
look to other evidence. . . . The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. . . . The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also
may shed some light on the decision-maker’s purposes.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
58. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 26, at 662; see also Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (holding that an injunction against firing minority firefighters under a
supposedly bona fide seniority system was impermissible because the seniority system was not
implemented with discriminatory intent); Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (holding that
a street closing that prevented Blacks from the full use and enjoyment of their property was
permissible because it was not evident that it was implemented with discriminatory intent).
59. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976).
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impact analysis has been used to invalidate similar laws, but shifts direction and reviews subsequent claims based on a lower standard of
review. This rationale is further complicated by the Court’s subsequent decision in Arlington Heights, where the Court says,
[I]t is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned
with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing
of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just
another competing consideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision,
this judicial deference is no longer justified.60

By drawing a questionable distinction between statutory and constitutional equal protection jurisprudence, the Davis Court established
a new and questionable standard for understanding the Equal Protection Clause.

Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of Blacks are challenged, discriminatory
purpose need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to demonstrate some
rational basis for the challenged practices. It is necessary, in addition, that they be
validated in terms of job performance in any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the minimum skill, ability, or potential necessary for the position at issue and determining whether the qualifying tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified
applicants for the job in question. However this process proceeds, it involves a more
probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special
racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed to adopt
this more rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments in cases such as this.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
[F]or the cases present the ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish
an administration directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their
administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal protection of the
laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the Constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48
(1960) (“Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end,
and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional
result.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
60. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
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II. RACIALIZED MASS IMPRISONMENT: RESHAPING
AND REMAKING THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION
Without a comprehensive investigation of racialized mass imprisonment, it is possible to underestimate its status as rivaling Jim Crow,
both in its design and consequences for Black society and contemporary race relations. It is no overstatement that racialized mass imprisonment replaces Jim Crow as the post-segregation-era tool of Black
subjugation. If viewed only in the narrow context of the criminal justice system, comparing Jim Crow to racialized mass imprisonment appears to be hyperbole. After all, the adjudication of proven crimes is
a necessary and reasonable component of any well-functioning democracy. Reasonable people can agree on what should be neutral
principles of law, order, justice, equality, and punishment. Racialized
mass imprisonment, however, does not begin in the courtroom nor
with the legal process itself. In actuality, the courtroom is the inevitable end result of a variety of conditions and circumstances that lead
poor Black communities into cycles of criminality that mainstream society has characterized as worthy of the harshest penalties.61
An obvious counter-argument, however, would challenge any
over-reliance on structural arguments to explain all, or even a majority, of Black criminality and, accordingly, call into question any comparison between racialized mass imprisonment and Jim Crow. It
could be argued that Jim Crow was a political and social system forced
upon Black people, but the criminal activity at the root of racialized
mass imprisonment in the post-segregation era is largely a set of actions, behaviors, and choices individual Black people bring upon
themselves. Furthermore, Black criminality victimizes Black communities in the same way as Jim Crow. So, how is it possible to place
equal significance on these two systems, racialized mass imprisonment
and Jim Crow, when evaluating Black disadvantage and subjugation?
While compelling on their face, these arguments rely on a logic
that dislocates Black criminality in the post-segregation era and the
particular economic, political, and social conditions that characterize
it from similar conditions that grew out of Jim Crow. Furthermore,
these arguments confuse Black criminality with the disproportionate
and draconian social and institutional responses to non-violent crimes,
such as drug abuse and trafficking, that drive concerns around racial61. See, e.g., THE MANY COLORS OF CRIME: INEQUALITIES
CRIME IN AMERICA (Ruth D. Peterson et al. eds., 2006).
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ized mass imprisonment. At the heart of racialized mass imprisonment are questions regarding the appropriateness of non-violent
offender sentencing. Those questions arise against a backdrop of a
specific and particularly recent racial history. Jim Crow and racialized
mass imprisonment are essentially part of the same historical
processes and race-based logic. This history and logic forged the context for the community breakdowns that framed the economic and
social context for Black criminality in the post-segregation era. When
viewed in this manner, racialized mass imprisonment appears even
more sinister and deliberate because it emerges as an extension of Jim
Crow cloaked in the rhetoric of progress and neutrality, creating an
indisputably deliberate system of racial subjugation.62
The term racialized mass imprisonment appropriately and accurately characterizes the trends in American incarceration since 1970,
the immediate post-segregation era. The defining features of racialized mass imprisonment are: (1) the social, political, economic, and
psychological preconditions that trap Black communities in cyclical
poverty, isolate them from mainstream society, and, invariably, foster
criminality;63 (2) the sheer numbers of Black men and women represented in the American prison population; (3) the racialization of
crime and poverty in the mainstream mind; (4) the collateral socioeconomic and cultural effects of racialized mass imprisonment; and
(5) the mainstream rationalization that perceives Black people as
62. This is not to suggest that Black criminality in the crime-ridden urban ghettoes of 1970s
and 1980s America is wholly the problem of systems, processes, and institutions based outside of
the community and looming ominously over it. Such a perspective can only cast Black communities as helplessly controlled by the whims and designs of others—namely Whites—and incapable of exercising any agency in shaping the direction of their communities or their individual
lives. Furthermore, it is as blind and short-sighted as the opposite perspective—the one that
dominated social science discussion of the day and continues to characterize the mainstream
consensus—that Black criminality was entirely the result of Black agency, specifically weak family structures and a generally morally bankrupt culture. Any consideration of Black criminality
in any period, but especially the immediate post-segregation era, should consider both the influence of structure and the influence of individual agency. But individual agency, to some considerable extent, occurs within certain structures—people make decisions within the context of
certain environments and histories. In the immediate post-segregation era, countless institutional forces defined and confined Black self-determination and are seldom given proper consideration in analyses of Black criminality. This becomes especially clear when considering the
sentencing laws established in the 1980s to target low-level Black drug offenders.
63. The “criminality” that is fostered is specifically related to the underground drug economies that have flourished in poor Black inner city communities since the 1970s. The toll that
drug abuse has taken on Black communities should not be underestimated, but the policing and
public policy designed to address these social issues was largely racist in its penchant for racial
profiling, police brutality, a rampant disregard for civil liberties, and the design and imposition of
the harshest penalties for crimes known to be committed disproportionately by poor Blacks.
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hyper-criminal and consequently prefers draconian and harshly retributive methods to punish them.64
While a coherent narrative regarding the manner in which Jim
Crow circumscribed Black opportunity exists, racialized mass imprisonment exists on the periphery of the post-segregation-era consciousness. Its racist foundation and the manner in which it cripples Black
social, political, economic, and cultural institutions and potential are
not widely understood. It is not clear to most Americans whether
racialized mass imprisonment is the fault of criminally prone Black
people, aberrational racial profiling in policing, or something more
calculated and sinister. There is, however, a specific history of racialized mass imprisonment interwoven with the social, economic, and political reorganizations of the post-segregation era.
A. Getting “Tough on Crime”: Laying the Foundation
In a 1968 Harris poll, 81% of respondents believed that law and
order had broken down because of “communists” and “Negroes who
started the riots.”65 Blacks in large inner cities rioted considerably
during the late 1960s, largely in response to rampant police brutality,
grossly unequal employment opportunities, and growing impatience
with a perceived accommodationist, slow-moving, and elitist Civil
Rights Movement.66 Against this backdrop, the Vietnam War sparked
increasing protests, a sexual revolution challenged traditional patriarchy, and the Warren Court handed down a number of progressive
criminal justice decisions, including Gideon v. Wainwright67 and Miranda v. Arizona.68 Consequently, in a time of rising rebellion and
disorder, a liberal Court actively using the Constitution to reshape
American society curtailed the police powers of the state.
64. See, e.g., CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED, supra note 2, at 105-32 (discussing the history
of racialized mass imprisonment and the economic aspects of its theory and methods); COLE,
supra note 2, at 16-62, 132-57 (discussing racial profiling, police brutality, and politics and policy
of mass incarceration); GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 147-64 (discussing the political dimensions of mass imprisonment in the Black community); MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 2 (covering several dimensions of mass imprisonment and its relationship to larger patterns and
processes of economic, racial, and political struggle); MAUER, supra note 2.
65. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF
CRISIS 7 (1999).
66. See, e.g., ZINN, supra note 35, at 450-57.
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the poor have a right to public defense).
68. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing procedural safeguards to protect against self-incrimination during a police interrogation).
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Up until the end of the 1960s, indeterminate sentencing and an
emphasis on rehabilitation characterized the corrections system.69 In
1973, the final report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that “no new institutions for adults should be built and existing institutions for juveniles
should be closed.”70 That same year, New York passed the Rockefeller Drug Laws.71 The wide sweeping drug laws established a fifteenyear prison term for anyone convicted of selling two ounces or possessing four ounces of narcotics, regardless of the offender’s criminal
history.72 Judges previously had wide discretion to consider an offender’s criminal history and other subjective factors.73 This shift in
conventional wisdom can be attributed, in large part, to the destabilized landscape of race, class, and politics that characterized the
1970s.74
Similarly, the demise of Jim Crow coincided with new patterns of
large-scale economic restructuring and social reorganization in the
1960s and 1970s.75 This restructuring created a crisis not just among
the ranks of poor and working class urban Blacks, but also within the
White working class. Amidst the backdrop of the 1960s Civil Rights
and Voting Rights Acts and the gradual integration of public schools,
dramatic changes were taking shape on the American residential landscape.76 This decade saw shifts in the allocation of public funds, loca69. See Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States,
in MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 2, at 5.
70. See id. at 4-5 (“By 1973, the final report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that ‘no new institutions for adults should be
built and existing institutions for juveniles should be closed’ and concluded that ‘the prison, the
reformatory, and the jail have achieved only a shocking record of failure.’ ” (citing NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS 358 (1973))).
71. See N.Y. PENAL § 220.00–220.65 (2006).
72. See Mauer, supra note 69, at 5; see also Drop the Rock, http://www.droptherock.org
(last visited Mar. 2, 2007).
73. Such discretion did not always favor the fair administration of justice and prior to
mandatory minimums some called for such predictability in sentencing to curtail the freedom of
racist judges. See generally Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001).
74. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE
NEW URBAN POOR 25-50 (1996).
75. See e.g., PARENTI, supra note 65, at 29-38 (discussing the social and economic developments reshaping the perceptions of and appropriate social responses to race and crime at the
onset of World War II through the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan for U.S. President); see also
WILSON, supra note 74, at 25-50.
76. See, e.g., K. Crowder, The Racial Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Level Assessment of the White Flight Hypothesis, 29 SOC. SCI. RES., June 2000, at 223 (presenting research
that indicates that the likelihood of Whites leaving a neighborhood increases significantly with
the size of the minority population in the neighborhood and that Whites are especially likely to
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tion of capital investments by the public and private sectors, and
spatial isolation of inner city poverty. These factors were related, in
large measure, to the changes brought on by the social and economic
reorganizations of the era. Their primary and most visible result,
however, was the emigration of Whites from cities.77
As the non-violent protests of the Civil Rights Movement gave
way to the Black Power movement and the urban riots of 1968, the
specter of violent, angry, and uncontrollable poor urban Blacks served
as a powerful trope for mobilizing suburban Whites around law and
order themes. Not only was it growing increasingly unfashionable to
be openly racist, the Warren Court made it clear that overt racial discrimination would no longer receive judicial sanction.78 Conservatives
realized that racism would have to be coded in a manner that satisfied
middle America’s need to feel non-racist, while still maintaining the
vestiges of White superior status. For conservatives who vocally opposed the racial implications of the liberal social agenda of the 1950s
and 1960s, reconstructing the mainstream conception of crime to fit
the new racial agenda would lay the groundwork to transition out of
the 1960s into the post-segregation era, while shoring up what remained of White privilege.79
leave neighborhoods containing combinations of multiple minority groups); George C. Galster,
White Flight from Racially Integrated Neighbourhoods in the 1970s: The Cleveland Experience, 27
URB. STUD. 385 (1990) (presenting econometric research indicating that segregationist sentiment
was a primary driver in white emigration from racially integrating neighborhoods).
77. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SUBURBS (1976); see
also WILSON, supra note 74, at 25-50 (discussing the various factors characterizing the development of an isolated and economically disadvantaged ghetto underclass).
78. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal”
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we
hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes
unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 495 (citations omitted); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J. concurring) (“I have previously expressed the belief that ‘it is simply not possible for a state law to
be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of
the actor.’ ”) (citation omitted).
79. See, e.g., PARENTI, supra note 65, at 38-44. In addition to the expansion of constitutional protection to issues concerning race, the Republican agenda was also opposed to the War
on Poverty, which reflects a class consciousness and certain ideological beliefs about the role of
government in the economy. The War on Poverty shifted considerable government resources to
traditionally marginalized groups, many of which were democratic constituencies. By redistributing resources to these groups, their ability to organize and mobilize increased, empowering
radical movements and organized labor.
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Initially, the social rebellion of the late 1960s was the political
issue that fueled the emergence of law and order rhetoric from such
conservative politicians as Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon.80 In
the 1968 Presidential election, the Republican platform—most successfully through Richard Nixon’s Presidential campaign—developed
a “tough on crime” rhetoric targeted specifically at White suburban
voters. Nixon and the Republicans realized that galvanizing the new
White suburban voting class could be achieved, in part, by appealing
to the fears at the very core of their identity. For a community formed
around a backlash to specific racial and social “disorder,” Republicans
realized that reconstructing this idea of “disorder” as “crime,” and advocating for new methods of social control to address “crime” was an
effective political strategy.81 Therefore, law and order became the
central rhetoric of the new conservative movement.82
Nixon was well aware of the currency a “tough on crime” message could have with the new class of exiled White suburban voters.
Shortly after his 1968 victory, Nixon wrote his mentor, Dwight Eisenhower, about the power of anti-crime rhetoric and its racial content.
Nixon wrote, “I have found great audience response to this [law and
order] theme in all parts of the country, including areas like New
Hampshire where there is virtually no race problem and relatively little crime.”83 Nixon essentially gave birth to this racially-driven law
and order fear-mongering as an effective political strategy. In his diary, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H. R. Haldeman, wrote: “[President
Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole prob-

80. See e.g., PARENTI, supra note 65, at 6-7.
81. For a discussion on race and the formulation of the early conservative movement, including Nixon’s 1968 Presidential campaign, see DAN T. CARTER, FROM GEORGE WALLACE TO
NEWT GINGRICH: RACE IN THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION, 1963-1994 (1999).
82. See id. At the 2005 NAACP National Convention, the National Republican Party
Chairman Ken Mehlman apologized for the Republican “Southern Strategy” of using racial polarization to mobilize White voters in the South. Mehlman said, “Some Republicans gave up on
winning the African-American vote, looking the other way or trying to benefit politically from
racial polarization. I am here today as the Republican chairman to tell you we were wrong.”
Bob Herbert, An Empty Apology, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005 (quoting Ken Mehlman, Chairman,
Nat’l Republican Party, Address at the Annual Convention of the NAACP (July 14, 2005)). The
apology was largely viewed as empty considering that exploiting racial polarization played a
significant role in the 1988 campaign of George H.W. Bush and the 2000 campaign of George W.
Bush, both Republicans. The “southern strategy” hinged on law and order rhetoric and
preached “conservative” values to signal a return to American life before the 1960s social upheavals. Herbert, supra.
83. See PARENTI, supra note 65, at 7, (citing DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR
ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF FAILURE 11 (1996)).
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lem is really the Blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes
this while not appearing to.”84
While the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation slowed
down the Republicans’ “tough on crime” rhetoric, the ideology driving its popularity remained in tact and gained momentum. By the
1980 presidential election, the country was reeling in a massive recession and the liberal war on poverty appeared a misguided venture and
tainted President Carter’s re-election hopes. Ronald Reagan capitalized on these issues in his Presidential campaign and instituted dramatic changes once in office. Specifically, Reagan employed two
major policy shifts: (1) the adoption of a monetary policy that resulted
in a dramatic increase in interest rates, and (2) the evisceration of social services (war on poverty spending).85 The Reagan era set the
stage for an increase in urban blight. During the same period, White
and middle class flight from cities increased and jobs followed.86
There was consequently an explosion in the number of urban census
tracts that qualified as ghettos.87 These ghettos were overwhelmingly
Black and trapped within the confines of cyclical, crippling poverty,
against a shrinking domestic industrial base.
The public discourse about this new underclass was dominated by
neo-conservative rhetoric and dogma.88 While there has always been
a racialized discourse on the culture of poverty within the elite ranks
of the social science industry,89 the combination of a failed war on
poverty, the end of Jim Crow, and the dramatic socio-economic shifts
of the 1970s brought a new culture of poverty conversation to the
forefront—one that linked recent racial liberalism with the poverty
84. See PARENTI, supra note 65, at 12 (quoting H.R. HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN DIARIES:
INSIDE THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE 53 (1994)).
85. See, e.g., id. at 38-41 (discussing how higher interest rates squeezed business growth and
weakened labor and how social services cuts further eroded the working and poor classes, reducing social support for the poor and working poor); ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE:
SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH CENTURY U.S. HISTORY 242-45
(2001) (discussing the impact of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981; the Reagan
recession of 1981-1982, which drove poverty to over 15%; and cuts in the agencies and organizations supporting President Johnson’s War on Poverty).
86. See WILSON, supra note 74, at 42-48 (discussing the transformation of once predominately non-poor White areas to poor Black ones).
87. See id. at 14 (“In the nation’s one hundred largest central cities, nearly one in seven
census tracts is at least forty percent poor. The number of such tracts has more than doubled
since 1970.”).
88. See, e.g., O’CONNOR, supra note 85, at 246-59 (discussing both the development of neoconservative rhetoric and a neo-liberal discourse that formed a new “welfare consensus” constructed around conceptions of the “deserving” and “underserving” poor and government approaches to their plight).
89. See generally id. at 74-123.
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and despair that characterized life for more than a third of the Black
community. It was not shy about race either. This new culture of poverty discussion, held mostly in the press and news media, focused almost exclusively on the behavior and agency of the Black poor.90
As deindustrialization took hold, urban poverty replaced social
rebellion as the political context for tougher crime laws. Black discontent over civil rights in the 1960s shifted to economic inequality in the
1970s. During the social upheavals of the 1960s, Blacks placed demands on the government for better employment, political, and social
opportunities. By the 1980s, deindustrialization and inner city isolation forced Blacks to place new demands on the government to intervene in what had emerged as a new system of social and economic
racial exclusion. It was clear that one system of subjugation had been
replaced by another—one equally as virulent and disenfranchising.
This new form of subjugation, however, was still in its infancy and
lacked a coherent methodology for its policies and politics.
B. The Law as Politics: The Court in Transition
As society changed and reacted to the new race rules and concurrent macro economic developments, the Supreme Court also changed
in a manner that both shaped the new social arrangements and ignited
counter movements that impacted the political forces shaping the
90. See, e.g., Myron Magnet, America’s Underclass: What to Do?, FORTUNE, May 11, 1987,
at 130.
Disproportionately Black and Hispanic, [members of the underclass] are still a minority
within these minorities. What primarily defines [the underclass] is not so much their
poverty or race as their behavior-their chronic lawlessness, drug use, out-of wedlock
births, nonwork, welfare dependency, and school failure. Underclass describes a state
of mind and a way of life. It is at least as much a cultural as an economic condition. . . .
The great paradox is that the underclass is a byproduct of two decades of extensive
Black success.
Id.
What went wrong for the 4 million Black Americans still trapped in festering inner-city
ghettos? Why do one-third of all Black families remain mired in poverty? Why is the
jobless rate for Black teenagers 40%? Why are 60% of all Black children born out of
wedlock? And why has the American ghetto become a self-perpetuating nightmare of
fatherless children, welfare dependency, crime, gangs, drugs and despair?
Walter Shapiro, The Ghetto: From Bad to Worse; the Wounds of the 1967 Riots Still Fester, TIME,
Aug. 24, 1987, at 18.
Why is it that two decades of visible Black progress, with billions spent in welfare and
training, have also seen the explosive rise of an alienated Black underclass whose rootlessness, violence and debased values dominate the ghetto? . . . crime and the fear of
crime, drug and alcohol abuse, arson, vandalism, a dilapidated bombed-out physical
environment and a way of life utterly separate from the American mainstream have
become associated with poor city Blacks more than any other group . . . [t]he truth is
we are up against the limits of public policy. At the heart of the disaster there is a
vacuum of values.
Mortimer Zuckerman, The Black Underclass, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 14, 1986, at 78.
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Court. The instrumentalist nature of the Warren Court drew both
praise and criticism from scholars, legal practitioners, and laypeople
alike. The cases decided during the Warren era rightly characterized
the Court’s activist nature, for, in many ways, the Court directed the
law and the interpretation of the Constitution in the image of a changing and evolving society.91 The historic Brown v. Board of Education92 decision laid the legal foundation for the Civil Rights
Movement by overturning the doctrine of “separate but equal.”
Criminal law cases such as Gideon and Miranda expanded the protections afforded under the Bill of Rights, and targeted repressive and
excessive police power.93 Loving v. Virginia94 made miscegenation illegal and even called out its true intent through the use of the term
“White supremacy.”95 Some opposed the Warren Court’s activism out
of racism, fear, or the loss of political power. Others feared that the
Court had become both lawmaker and law interpreter.96
Chief Justice Warren was well aware of the conservative backlash
to his tenure as Chief Justice. Fearing a Nixon victory in 1968, Chief
Justice Warren resigned, well in advance of the election, in order to
allow Johnson the opportunity to appoint his successor.97 Johnson
nominated Associate Justice Abe Fortas, one of the most liberal members of the Warren Court.98 The strategy backfired, however, and
amidst revelations of improprieties in his professional and personal
conduct, Justice Fortas was ultimately forced to resign his seat as Associate Justice.99 Consequently, his nomination to Chief Justice cost
liberal activists two seats on the Court.
With the liberal Court now in jeopardy, the 1968 presidential
campaign increased in significance. Against this backdrop, Richard
91. See, e.g., Robert Henry, The Players and the Play, in THE BURGER COURT: COUNTERREVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? 13 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998).
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
94. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
95. Id. at 11-12.
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving White persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. We have consistently denied the
constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race.
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial
classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
96. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 91, at 13.
97. See MALTZ, supra note 56.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 8.
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Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign championed law and order and
promised to nominate “strict constructionists” to the Court.100 Nixon
was open about setting in motion a counterrevolution to the Warren
Court era. While the Warren Court elevated the Fourteenth Amendment as the primary constitutional tool for guaranteeing individual
rights, the Nixon administation had the opportunity to remake the
Court in a manner that would stifle further progress in that direction.
Nixon was afforded the opportunity to appoint four justices in close
succession: Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, Jr., and
William Rehnquist.101
Historians generally regard 1968 as a turning point in the course
of the New Deal and civil rights political coalition.102 The appointment of Warren Burger to the position of Chief Justice coincides with
this historic political shift. The Warren Court, through numerous decisions in an array of legal areas, created new rights that challenged
entrenched status and placed new demands on the distribution of resources—particularly where the government and the private sector
were concerned.103 Race was central to these new demands, and the
movement of Blacks into employment, educational, and political
spaces previously unavailable to them threatened entrenched White
monopolies and White working- and middle-class power. The specter
of the riots of the late 1960s signaled, to many, that racial advancements had either gone too far or that Blacks wanted something
Whites were unwilling to share.104
The Burger Court actually proved to be more of an activist body
than the Warren Court, and it is not clear from the whole of the Burger Court’s decisions that Nixon accomplished his intended counterrevolution.105 For example, the Burger Court decided Roe v. Wade106
100. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 91, at 13.
101. MALTZ, supra note 56, at 1, 10; see also DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE
MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 41-42 (1992). Justice William H. Rehnquist was
nominated by Nixon for his conservative views on criminal justice, his advocacy of judicial restraint, and his legal support for Republican causes. For further discussion, see Henry, supra
note 91. Warren Burger was sworn in as the fourteenth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on
June 23, 1969. Powell and Rehnquist were nominated to the Court after the 1971 deathbed
retirements of Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan.
102. See Mark Tushnet, The Burger Court in Historical Perspective: The Triumph of CountryClub Republicanism, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 91, at 204.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 206.
105. In the same amount of time as the tenure of the Warren Court, the Burger Court struck
down 31 federal and 288 state laws, compared to the 21 federal laws and 150 state laws the
Warren Court struck down. Ironically, some of the Burger Court’s activist decisions were in
cases related to the Watergate scandal. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 91, at 30-32.
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and ousted Nixon from office.107 Its racial jurisprudence, however,
mostly reflected the 1970s conservative ideology. In spite of this
mixed bag of outcomes, what is clear is that Nixon’s appointment of
four avowedly conservative Supreme Court justices caused a considerable shift in the direction of the Supreme Court and ultimately the
direction of anti-discrimination law.108
C. The War on Drugs
In 1963, the Presidential Advisory Commission on Narcotic and
Drug Abuse released a report on its findings, recommending the relaxation of mandatory minimum sentences, increased appropriation
for research into all aspects of drug abuse, and the dismantling of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics. In addition, the Commission recommended an allocation of its functions to the Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare departments.109 Over the next four Presidential
administrations, the Commission’s recommendations were adopted in
one form or another.110 Reconceptualizing drug abuse as a problem
requiring treatment and education, as opposed to one warranting punitive and retributive responses, was a developing trend throughout
the 1960s and promised progressive approaches to drug abuse.
Political pressure to deliver major drug legislation to fulfill campaign promises of law and order, however, was mounting during the
Nixon administration. For politicians, the drug issue encompassed
several hot-button issues—crime, poverty, and middle class youth—
that made it a politically attractive focus. At a time when the Civil
Rights Movement, the anti-Vietnam War Movement, and the growth
of various subcultures threatened the conservative values of the
American middle class, drug use was viewed as embodying the worst
consequences of the new “counterculture.” Politicians realized that
major drug legislation would allow various political interests to claim
a victory for law, order, traditional values, and the general welfare of
American society. With the exception of New York’s Rockefeller
Drug Laws, the 1970s saw a general lowering of sentences for a variety
106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. See generally Tushnet, supra note 102, at 203.
109. See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 238
(3d ed. 1999).
110. See DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL:
POLITICS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981, at
7-8 (2002).

2007]

373

Howard Law Journal
of offenses. During the 1970s, eleven states decriminalized marijuana
following the Carter administration’s relaxed polices.111 Despite the
Administration’s relatively liberal stance, the awareness of drug abuse
and illegal activity quickly became a major political issue. Drug use
was also rising. In 1980, a National Institute on Drug Abuse study
revealed that 68% of young adults had tried marijuana, up from a
mere 4% in 1962,112 and a third of young adults experimented with
harder drugs like cocaine.113
The Presidency of Ronald Reagan, like Nixon’s, was anchored
upon the premise that new conservative leadership was necessary to
transform American culture and usher in a return to more traditional
notions of family, society, and morality.114 Given the recent advancements in rights for women, minorities, and the poor, “traditional” and
“conservative” could only mean a return to the recently banished
forms of subjugation. The drug issue, however, provided a rhetorical
cover for this avowedly conservative agenda. Reagan brought the
“war on drugs” into the American lexicon and put the full force of the
federal government behind a massive anti-drug campaign. To fight
this war, federal, state, and local governments spent over $100 billion
during the Reagan and Bush administrations.115 During the 1980s, the
federal anti-drug budget grew nine-fold to almost $13 billion a year,
approximately twice the budget of the Environmental Protection
Agency.116 Reagan’s supply-side economic ideology was reflected in
his approach to drug use—only 30% of the federal drug budget addressed the demand for drugs by rehabilitating users and educating
nonusers about the dangers of drugs.117
111. See MUSTO, supra note 109, at 260-61. The Carter administration chose to remove federal penalties for small amounts of the drug in 1977. See Mary Russell, Softer U.S. Pot Possession Law Backed, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1977, at A9.
112. See 68% of Young Adults Found To Have Tried Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1980,
at A12.
113. Id.
114. After getting the Republican Party nomination Ronald Reagan praised states’ rights in
his first speech made in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the site of the 1964 Klu Klux Klan murders of
three young civil rights workers: Michael Schwerner, James Cheney, and Andrew Goodman.
Reagan ranted about welfare queens supposedly riding around in Cadillacs. He even said people were homeless by choice. Reagan’s remarks were made at a Neshoba County, Mississippi
fair where for generations White Mississippi politicians gathered to initiate their campaigns.
Before the civil rights movement took hold in Mississippi, the fair was a forum where one White
politician after another called for states’ rights, a long recognized code phrase for the right of
states to maintain and enforce Jim Crow laws. See, e.g., Race Issue in Campaign: A Chain Reaction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1980; Reagan Campaigns at Mississippi Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1980.
115. Dan Baum, Tunnel Vision: The War on Drugs, 12 Years Later, 79 A.B.A. J. 70 (1993).
116. Id.
117. Id.

374

[VOL. 50:345

Intersection of Race and History
Overnight, documenting and reporting the dangers of drug abuse
and its rise among all segments of American society, especially
amongst the poor and racial minorities, consumed the media. By
1984, the use of “rock cocaine,” as it was called, was a recognized
trend sweeping America’s inner cities. The Washington Post reported
that rock cocaine users were buying the drug with welfare money in
Los Angeles’ “city neighborhoods south of downtown.”118 Police attention focused on underground operations and television shows like
Miami Vice glorified the crime-fighting efforts of law enforcement
against the international drug trade. By the summer of 1986, reports
from medical examiners in twenty-five metropolitan areas showed
that 185 cocaine-related deaths were reported in 1981, 580 in 1984,
and an even higher number was expected for 1985.119 That same summer, all three major television networks broadcast seventy-four evening news segments about drugs, more than half of them about
crack.120 Both Newsweek and Time magazine called crack the biggest
story since Vietnam and Watergate, and dubbed it the “Issue of the
Year” for 1986.121 Admissions to hospital emergency rooms for cocaine-related health problems at 700 hospitals rose to approximately
10,000 in 1985, from roughly 3,300 in 1981.122
The war on drugs was the centerpiece of Reagan’s “tough on
crime” mantra.123 One of Reagan’s first major crime-related policy
initiatives was the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).124 The
SRA achieved four major objectives: (1) it abolished parole for federal offenders; (2) it limited the amount of “time off” for good conduct offenders could earn, setting a maximum of fifty-four days per
year served; (3) it required offenders to serve a term of “supervised
release” upon discharge from prison; and (4) it required the development, promulgation, and adoption of sentencing guidelines that would
118. Jay Matthews, Drug Abuse Takes New Form; Rock Cocaine Is Peddled to the Poor In
Los Angeles, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1984, at A15.
119. Joe Brinkley, U.S. Says Cocaine Related Deaths are Rising, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1986, at
A1.
120. PARENTI, supra note 65, at 56.
121. See id. at 56-57 (citing CRAIG REINARMAN & HARRY G. LEVINE, The Crack Attack, in
CRACK IN AMERICA: DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 20 (1997)).
122. See Brinkley, supra note 119.
123. See generally WILLIAM N. ELWOOD, RHETORIC IN THE WAR ON DRUGS: THE TRIUMPHS
AND TRAGEDIES OF PUBLIC RELATIONS (1994) (discussing the war on drugs through the rhetoric
deployed by the Reagan and Bush administrations and the public perceptions it created).
124. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. III 1985)).
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structure the sentencing decisions of federal judges.125 The SRA set
up the Sentencing Commission, which directed and authorized the
creation of sentencing guidelines that were presumptively
mandatory.126 Ted Kennedy called the bill “the most far reaching law
enforcement reform in our country.”127
The Sentencing Commission was ostensibly geared to reduce sentencing disparities by eliminating the broad discretion enjoyed by federal judges. The establishment of the Sentencing Commission was not
without controversy. Within a year of the Commission’s creation, 244
federal judges nationwide had ruled on challenges to its constitutionality.128 Central to the opposition was the fact that the Sentencing
Commission contained federal judges amongst its ranks, thereby giving the judges both judicial and executive powers.129 The SRA required that three of the seven Presidential appointees to the
commission were judges. Critics charged that this violated separation
of powers and the case was heard before the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States.130 The Sentencing Commission was ultimately
found constitutional and was the dominant force in federal sentencing
until the 2005 Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Booker131
and United States v. Fanfan.132
125. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
126. See id.
127. See PARENTI, supra note 65, at 50.
128. Katherine Bishop, U.S. Appeals Court Upsets Federal Rules on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1988, at A16.
129. See id.
130. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohibit Congress from delegating to
an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory direction as is present here.
Nor does our system of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling
upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy
on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges. Accordingly, we hold that the Act is
constitutional.
Id. at 412.
131. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
The question presented in each of these cases is whether an application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. In each case, the courts below
held that binding rules set forth in the Guidelines limited the severity of the sentence
that the judge could lawfully impose on the defendant based on the facts found by the
jury at his trial. In both cases the courts rejected, on the basis of our decision in Blakely
v. Washington, the Government’s recommended application of the Sentencing Guidelines because the proposed sentences were based on additional facts that the sentencing
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence. We hold that both courts correctly
concluded that the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. at 226-27 (citation omitted).
132. 542 U.S. 955 (2004).
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When the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was passed, Republicans had no idea that current events would align Reagan’s “tough on
crime” legislative agenda with the Democrats. On June 19, 1986, Len
Bias, a rising twenty-two-year old Black basketball star at the University of Maryland College Park, was found dead in his dorm room from
an apparent overdose of cocaine.133 Bias’s death came two days after
the Boston Celtics made him the second pick in the National Basketball Association draft.134 Eight days later, on June 27, 1986, Don Rogers, a twenty-three-year old Black defensive back with the Cleveland
Browns, died after slipping into a cocaine-induced coma.135 Instantly,
their stories became a tragic reflection of a drug culture and epidemic
gone too far. Their race only solidified the public perceptions of the
connection between race and drugs.
The timing of the deaths of Bias and Rogers provided an ideal
context for political opportunists. The mid-term Congressional elections were set to occur in November of 1986, and the Democrats were
determined to maintain their stronghold in the House of Representatives. The Speaker of the House, Massachusetts Democratic Congressman Tip O’Neill, was set to retire that year. The Congressman
was deeply affected by Bias’s death. Bias had been set to move to
Massachusetts and join the Boston Celtics. After the July 4, 1986, recess and only days after the deaths of Bias and Rogers, O’Neill called
the Democratic Congressional leadership together and announced his
intention to use the drug issue to catapult the party to success in the
1986 mid-term elections.136 The writing of the drug legislation demanded by O’Neill took place during the August 1986 recess.137 The
Judiciary Subcommittee suggested the inclusion of mandatory minimums in the new drug legislation.138 Without hearings or input from
experts, the bill was written in subcommittee with mandatory minimums as its signature feature.
133. Joe Pichirallo & Mark Asher, Freebasing Suspected in Bias Death; Athlete Probably
Smoked Cocaine, Md. Official Says, WASH. POST, July 10, 1986, at A1.
134. Id.
135. Dave Sell, Cocaine Killed Rogers, Toxicologist Says, WASH. POST, June 30, 1986, at D1.
136. See MAUER, supra note 2, at 62.
137. Id.
138. Interview with Eric Sterling, President, Criminal Justice Policy Found., in Boston, Mass.
(Feb. 5, 2003). Mr. Sterling is a former counsel to the House Judiciary Committee and drafted
the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Mr. Sterling recently weighed in on the 100-to-1 ratio in a Los
Angeles Times op-ed that calls the sentencing disparity a “disaster” and proposes more sensible
policy reforms. See Eric E. Sterling, Take Another Crack at that Cocaine Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2006, at A17.
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The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was initially intended to target
drug kingpins—those responsible for selling and trafficking major
quantities of illegal drugs. In the original report issued by the House
Judiciary Committee, the triggering quantities for drug violations were
five kilograms of cocaine and 100 grams of crack cocaine for a minimum sentence of ten years and one kilogram of cocaine or twenty
grams of crack cocaine for a minimum sentence of five years.139 The
final Senate version of the bill lowered the amount of crack cocaine
necessary to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence from
100 grams to fifty grams.140 The bill also imposed twenty-nine new
mandatory minimum sentences, resulting in a 100:1 ratio between the
triggering quantities necessary for powder cocaine and crack cocaine
sentencing.141
All but eighteen lawmakers voted for the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.142 The 1986 mid-term elections saw the Democrats sweep the
House of Representatives and the Senate, prompting Tip O’Neill to
declare, “[I]f there was a Reagan revolution, it’s over.”143 Nevertheless, the return of mandatory minimum sentencing policies and the
implementation of unprecedented sentencing disparities was, in effect,
a conservative victory that would transform the criminal justice system
for the remainder of the twentieth century.144
139. See Sterling, supra note 138.
140. See id.
141. See PARENTI, supra note 65, at 57.
142. Id.
143. See Paul Taylor, Senate to Have 55 Democrats; Party Gains in House, Loses 8 Governorships to the GOP, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1986, at A1.
144. The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act did not end the development of “tough on crime” drug
policies at the federal level. The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 was the third major
enactment borne out of the mounting “war on drugs.” The 1988 Act made drug conspiracy
offenses subject to the same mandatory minimums as the substantive trafficking offenses. The
ability of the “conservative” victory to occur within a Democratic congress also reflects the politics of the day. After the 1984 presidential campaign successes of Jesse Jackson, Democrats were
under pressure to appear more conservative (i.e., less beholden to Black interests). While Democrats still embraced a more liberal social policy agenda than Republicans, winning favor with
conservative and moderate Whites helped swell the mid-term success. The Democratic Party
used inner city Blacks as a scape-goat, restoring a sense of moral authority and mainstream
credibility within liberal White politics. With the public perception of the drug problem linked
to crack cocaine, and crack linked to poor Blacks, the Democratic Party’s co-optation of the
tough on crime strategy, in many ways, reconciled the interests of liberal and conservative
Whites after a protracted period of ideological conflict concerning race and criminal justice. For
a discussion of the impact of Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns on the direction of the Democratic Party in the 1980s and 1990s, specifically the formation of the Democratic
Leadership Council and calls for “moderation” within the party’s policy, see JoAnn Wypijewski,
The Rainbow’s Gravity: Twenty Years After Jesse Jackson’s Historic Run for President, What Does
It All Mean?, NATION, Aug. 2, 2004, at 33.
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D. Racialized Mass Imprisonment: Statistics and Facts
President Reagan signed the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act into law
on October 27, 1986, and, in doing so, allocated $97 million to build
new prisons.145 The war on drugs has undoubtedly contributed to a
dramatic rise in the prison population. The United States has the
highest rate of incarceration in the world, imprisoning 714 persons per
100,000 residents.146 An estimated 98,000 Blacks were incarcerated in
1954, the time of the historic Brown v. Board of Education decision.147
At that time, the federal prison population was 330,000.148 By 2002,
that population had increased to 2.1 million and the number of incarcerated Black men was 884,500.149 Drug offenders in state and federal
prisons represent one of the largest sources of prison population
growth in the past twenty years, increasing from 23,700 in 1980 to
319,600 by 1999.150 Sixty-eight percent of federal criminals are ethnic
minorities—39% Black and 29% Latino.151 In 2002, 81% of the offenders sentenced for crack trafficking were Black.152 The average
sentence was 119 months for crack defendants and 78 months for powder cocaine defendants.153
Drug use and crime are commonly viewed as minority problems,
but that is not the case. The National Institute of Drug Abuse survey
of high school seniors in 1998 to 1999 showed that White students use
cocaine at seven to eight times the rate of Black students and heroin
at seven times the rate of Black students.154 The racial bias in drug
145. See Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, FRONTLINE, available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
146. See SENTENCING PROJECT/NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN POPULATION
CONTINUES (2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin%5CDocuments%5C
publications%5Cinc_newfigures.pdf.
147. See MARC MAUER & RYAN SCOTT KING, SENTENCING PROJECT, SCHOOLS AND PRISONS: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 1 (2004), at 1, available at http://
www.sentencingproject.org/Admin%5CDocuments%5Cpublications%5Crd_brownvboard.pdf.
148. See id. at 3.
149. See id. at 1.
150. See SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW PRISON POPULATION FIGURES SHOW SLOWING OF
GROWTH BUT UNCERTAIN TRENDS (2000), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/
newbjs.pdf.
151. See SENTENCING PROJECT, THE EXPANDING FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_expanding_fedpopulation
.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
152. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES, (2004),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15year.htm.
153. See id.
154. See Drugs and Disparity: The Racial Impact of Illinois’ Practice of Transferring Young
Drug Offenders to Adult Court, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, available at http://www.building
blocksforyouth.org/illinois/illinois.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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law enforcement is confirmed by the research of the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, which found that while Blacks constitute only 14% of
all drug users nationally, they account for 35% of all drug arrests, 55%
of all drug convictions, and 75% of all prison admissions for drug
offenses.155
Racialized mass imprisonment has a powerful economic component to its operation and growth. The prison industrial complex—the
private sector dominated industry of prisons and prison services—
commodifies the demand for prisoners and relies heavily on state and
federal cooperation to maximize profits.156 A 1998 study produced by
the Correctional Association and the Justice Policy Institute illustrated how public funds had been diverted from public university
budgets to prison construction in New York.157 The report found that
between 1988 and 1998, the Department of Correctional Services received a $761 million increase in funding, while funding for New York
City and state university systems declined by $615 million.158 Additionally, in 2000, the California Department of Corrections estimated
that it would need to spend $6.1 billion over the next decade to maintain its more than 163,000 person prison population.159
Racialized mass imprisonment also affects voting power. Voting
restrictions disproportionately affect minorities and are the legal vestiges of Reconstruction-era practices that kept former slaves from voting. In thirty-two states, convicted offenders on parole cannot vote.
In twenty-eight states, this right is further restricted to exclude individuals on probation.160 Thirteen states permanently disenfranchise
ex-offenders who have completed their sentence, regardless of the offense.161 As a result, it is estimated that 3.9 million Americans, 2% of
the adult population, cannot vote due to felony convictions.162 Seventy-three percent of the 3.9 million disenfranchised voters are not in
155. See GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 154 (citation omitted).
156. See, e.g., CORRECTIONS (Crazy Hungry Fish Productions 2001), available at http://www
.buyindies.com/listings/1/0/1002135209765.html.
157. See GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 154-55 (citing Robert Gangi et al., New York State
of Mind? Higher Education Funding vs. Prison Funding in the Empire State, 1988-1998, JUSTICE
POLICY INSTITUTE (1998)); Stan Choe, The Fund-A-Mentality Difference Between Prisons and
School, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 7, 1999, at 12-13.
158. See id.
159. See GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 155.
160. See id. at 159; see also Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesny-Lind eds., 2002).
161. See Mauer, supra note 160, at 51.
162. See GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 159; see also Mauer, supra note 160, at 51.
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prison, but are on probation, parole, or are ex-offenders.163 Furthermore, 13% of Black men, or 1.4 million individuals, are disenfranchised under these laws—440,000 of whom have completed their
sentences and paid their debt to society.164
The criminal justice system does not just affect men. In 1980,
12,000 women were incarcerated in American prisons.165 By 1999,
that figure had climbed to 90,000.166 Over 57% of women serving
time in state prisons reported sexual or physical abuse at least once
before their admission to prison, compared to over 16% for men.167
In many cases, the growth in numbers of women in the prison system
is due, in part, to the consequences of survival strategies employed by
girls and women to resist oppression and brutality in their homes and
in their communities.168
The effects of racialized mass imprisonment are not confined to
the realm of criminal justice. They permeate every facet of activity in
the Black community. Three quarters of prisoners have a history of
drug or alcohol abuse, one-sixth have a history of mental illness, and
more than half of women inmates have a history of sexual or physical
abuse.169 Once incarcerated, prisoners’ individual problems are almost always exacerbated. When they return to society, the collateral
consequences of mass incarceration are codified in a range of federal,
state, and local laws. Some of these controversial government measures include denying public assistance to persons convicted of drug
crimes, evicting entire families from public housing if one member is
convicted of a drug charge, and a range of other policies that harshly
penalize people and families for drug-related incarcerations.170
E. Conclusion to Part II
The complex and simultaneous interplay between the “tough on
crime” movement, Supreme Court politics, the War on Drugs, and the
resulting escalation in racialized mass imprisonment, characterizes the
impetus for and the inevitable consequences of the intent requirement
163. See GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 159; see also Mauer, supra note 160, at 51.
164. See GREAT WELLS, supra note 2, at 159-60.
165. Meda Chesney-Lind, Imprisoning Women: The Unintended Victims of Mass Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 160, at 80.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 83.
168. Id. at 84; see also Prisons Adapt to Female Inmates (CNN Oct. 12, 2005).
169. See INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 160, at 2.
170. See id.
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of Davis. While similar in many aspects to the developments that led
to Plessy, this collection of forces is uniquely characteristic of the
immediate post-segregation era, particularly the demand for a raceneutral political and public policy lexicon to communicate the longstanding logic of racial subjugation and White-privilege in America.
The logic of the War on Drugs and the preference for draconian
methods of incarceration contradict the conventional wisdom that
predated them. The rationale for these dramatic shifts in social policy
reflects the need for new methods of social control to address current
social realities. It is understandable, therefore, that the logic of the
War on Drugs considered that the drug problem: (1) was distinctively
a problem of Black agency; (2) was a reflection of a decline in cultural
values and morals, linked directly to racial liberalism and ultimately
threatening to mainstream society and cultural values; and (3) required a harsh, punitive response, no matter how inexpensive the alternatives or disastrous the consequences for Black society and
American democracy.
While crack was a problem in Black communities and inner cities,
its popularity as a drug and the thriving underground economy that
arose to support it were distinctively linked to the surplus labor force
of the economically isolated and abandoned inner city. Because of
the catastrophic toll drug abuse took on individuals, families, and
communities, all drug abuse needed to be policed, treated, controlled,
and, if necessary, punished with incarceration. Crack cocaine, however, was singled out for an unreasonably harsher sentence. The logic
behind the dramatic sentencing disparities between crack and powder
cocaine, given the racialized manner in which crack cocaine abuse was
reported and popularly understood, can only be seen as racist and,
therefore, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
III.

TRUE INTENT: DAVIS AND CLARY

By the mid 1990s, the disparity in sentencing between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses emerged as a target for attack
within the progressive and Black legal communities. Between 1989
and 2001, several cases challenged the crack laws; all were denied certiorari by the Supreme Court and halted in the various appellate
courts. Many of these cases were brought on equal protection
grounds and argued that the application of the crack laws resulted in a
disparate racial impact in drug sentencing and the laws were, there382
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fore, unconstitutional. Equal protection challenges to the crack laws
had to contend directly with the intent requirement of Davis, the legal
precedent used to strike down these challenges in almost every instance. Through these cases, Davis’s role as a stop-gap for progress in
anti-discrimination law becomes clear. Despite considerable empirical evidence that the political circumstances surrounding the passage
of the crack laws rationally satisfy a showing of discriminatory intent,
the courts have been unmoved.
United States v. Eirby171 is one of the most recent cases to challenge the crack versus powder cocaine sentencing disparity on equal
protection grounds.172 Defendant-appellant Eirby, a Black man, pled
guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base (crack), which carries a
penalty of no less than five years and no more than forty years.173
Eirby challenged the sentencing requirement on equal protection
grounds, arguing that the crack laws denied Blacks equal protection of
the laws.174 Both in the trial court and on appeal, Eirby’s equal protection claims were summarily dismissed.175 The First Circuit relied
on a previous holding in another case challenging the crack laws,
United States v. Singleterry,176 stating that it found “insufficient evidence that the distinction drawn between cocaine base and cocaine
was motivated by any racial animus or discriminatory intent on the
part of either Congress or the Sentencing Commission.”177
The position that the crack laws violate the Equal Protection
Clause has been expressed through several arguments. One argument
is that the crack laws target Blacks through an irrational and arbitrary
171. 262 F.3d. 31 (1st Cir. 2001).
172. See also United States v. Patterson, 258 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Thomas, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11899 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Banks, 130 F.3d 621, 626
(4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Stevens,
19 F.3d 93, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d
623 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1990).
173. See Eirby, 262 F.3d at 34-35; see also 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2004).
174. See Eirby, 262 F.3d at 41.
175. Id.
176. 29 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 1994).
177. See Eirby, 262 F.3d 31, at 41.
We addressed this precise issue in United States v. Singleterry in which we rejected the
claim of unconstitutional treatment because we found insufficient evidence that the
distinction drawn between cocaine base and cocaine was motivated by any racial animus or discriminatory intent on the part of either Congress or the Sentencing Commission. The appellant has offered us nothing new, and we are thus bound to follow our
earlier ruling. Consequently, although we recognize the severity of the penalty paradigm vis-a-vis crack cocaine, we must uphold it.
Id. at 41 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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anti-drug policy.178 Defendants making this claim have asserted that
crack and powder cocaine are essentially the same drug and, therefore, should not be subject to different sentencing provisions.179
Courts have held that the increased penalties for crack cocaine are
rationally related to Congress’ objective of protecting the public
welfare.180
Another argument is that the sentencing rules fail the rational
basis test and, therefore, call for a heightened level of scrutiny.181 Defendants making this claim typically argue that the statutory classifications disadvantage a suspect class or impinge upon the exercise of
fundamental rights.182 Courts have relied on Davis and other cases to
hold that disparate impact alone is insufficient to warrant strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.183
A third argument asserts that Congress acted with a discriminatory purpose in enacting the crack laws.184 In response, the circuit
courts have almost unanimously held that there is insufficient evidence to find racial animus or discriminatory intent on the part of
Congress or the Sentencing Commission.185 The courts have routinely
invoked the premise of Davis, holding that Congress does not need to
explicitly state its reasons for passing legislation so long as a court can
divine some rational purpose.186 Courts have held that discriminatory
purpose implies that the lawmakers selected a particular course of action “at least in part or because of, not merely in spite of,” its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.187 Courts have also found a broad
178. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 258 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412-13 (9th Cir. 1992).
179. See Harding, 971 F.2d at 412.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 1990).
181. See Harding, 971 F.2d at 412.
182. Id.
183. See United States v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
184. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
185. See United States v. Eirby, 262 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir. 2001).
186. See Harding, 971 F.2d 410, at 412-13 (quoting United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245,
1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A legislative body need not explicitly state its reasons for passing legislation so long as a court can divine some rational purpose.”)).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Byse, 28 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 1994). In United States v.
Thurmond, for instance, the Tenth Circuit cites Congress’ stated intentions in the Congressional
record as evidence of neutral and objective justifications for the disparities in punishment. See
United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 1993). In keeping with the colorblind logic
popular in the post-segregation era, the Thurmond court is apparently looking for the smoking
gun of racist discriminatory intent—perhaps a record stating, “this law will do in all Black people,” or something equally as unlikely.
[T]here is ample evidence of Congress’s reasons, other than race, for providing harsher
penalties for offenses involving cocaine base. This is not a case where the dispropor-
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and legitimate basis for punishing crack more severely than powder
cocaine by relying on claims that crack is more physiologically and
psychologically potent.188 Additionally, courts have focused on the
manner in which crack and powder cocaine are ingested, citing that
the quicker and more addictive high gained from smoking crack warrants a stricter penalty.189 Courts have ultimately found crack cocaine
and powder cocaine to be objectively distinguishable and that the penalties attached to crack cocaine further the legitimate government interest of eliminating controlled substance distribution and abuse.190
One of the most renowned cases to address the constitutionality
of the crack laws is United States v. Clary.191 This case exemplifies
intellectual rigor and judicial integrity as it boldly challenges the
widely held belief that attacking the crack laws was politically unfeasible and jurisprudentially impossible. Against the overwhelming
weight of judicial precedent upholding the constitutionality of the
crack laws, U.S. District Court Judge Clyde S. Cahill ultimately found
the crack laws unconstitutional, stating in the text of his opinion,
“[T]his court accepts the Eighth Circuit’s invitation to present a novel
legal analysis of the adverse disparate impact on Blacks resulting from
the imposition of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).”192 In Clary, the district court held that the crack laws were unconstitutional and supported its position with a carefully researched analysis and opinion.
tionate impact of the statute and guidelines on African-Americans is unexplainable on
grounds other than race. Rather, the government offered evidence that Congress provided for enhanced penalties for cocaine base offenses because cocaine base (1) has a
more rapid onset of action; (2) is more potent; (3) is more highly addictive; (4) is less
expensive than cocaine powder; and (5) has widespread availability.
7 F.3d at 952-53 (internal citations and quotations omitted). But see Matthew F. Leitman, A
Proposed Standard of Equal Protection Review for Classifications Within the Criminal Justice
System that Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A Case Study of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’
Classification Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL. L. Rev. 215 (1994); Sklansky,
supra note 15.
188. See Harding, 971 F.2d at 413.
Congress’s decision to punish the sale of crack more severely than the sale of powder
cocaine was based on a broad and legitimate basis. Although crack and powder cocaine are different forms of the same drug, the routes of administration, their physiological and psychological effects, and the manner in which they are sold set the two
forms of the drug apart. Crack is normally smoked in a glass pipe, while powder cocaine is most often ingested nasally. Because it is smoked, crack has a quicker and more
intense effect on the brain than powder cocaine ingested nasally, causing a greater desire for more. Crack is also sold in smaller quantities and lower unit prices than powder
cocaine, thereby reducing the financial barrier which had previously limited cocaine
usage.
Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 846 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Mo. 1994), rev’d, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994).
192. Id.
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In the opinion, Judge Cahill methodically deconstructs the arguments
used to uphold the crack statute as constitutional within the traditional frameworks of equal protection jurisprudence.
Judge Cahill begins his analysis by reviewing the factors the Supreme Court has recognized for determining whether a law was motivated by racial discrimination, including the legislative history, the
overall historical context of the legislation, and the presence of a racially disparate impact.193 He acknowledges that given the trajectory
of racial progress throughout American history and the new post-segregation-era regime of colorblindness, most contemporary legislation
would not likely contain overtly racist referrals and would go to considerable lengths to eliminate any allusion to racial factors influencing
the construction of legislation.194 The opinion historicizes race and
punishment in America, specifically concerning the drug laws.195
193. See Clary, 846 F. Sup. at 773.
Whether or not racial discrimination was involved in legislative action that resulted in a
law which, although facially neutral, still has a racially disparate impact “demands a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial evidence of intent as may be available.”
Under Arlington, the Supreme Court set forth key factors to evaluate whether a law
was motivated by racial discrimination. These factors included the presence of disparate impact, the overall historical context of the legislation, the legislative history of the
challenged law, and departures from the normal legislative process. Additional legal
precedent has provided the Court with more criteria for its review, such as foreseeability of the consequences of the legislation; however, Arlington provides the Court with
the major benchmark to discover the presence of racial influence in the legislative decision making process.
Id. (internal citations).
194. Id. at 774.
Overt racism, evidenced by such occurrences as “Jim Crow Laws,” allowed legislators
to enact racist laws without reprisals. As civil rights for all Americans became a reality,
continued attempts to maintain racial barriers took on the form of more subtle, covert,
facially neutral legislation. Examples of this type of legislation included zoning, voting
and housing laws.
Today most legislation would not contain overtly racist referrals and, indeed,
would eliminate the slightest allusion to racial factors in the words of the legislation
itself. But today, despite the fact that a law may be racially neutral on its face, there
still may be factors derived from unconscious racism that affect and infiltrate the legislative result.
Id.
195. Id. at 774-75.
Prior to the civil rights era, Congress repeatedly imposed severe criminal sanctions
on addictive substances once they became popular with minorities. Historically, a consortium of reactionary media and a subsequently inflamed constituency have combined
to influence Congress to impose more severe criminal sanctions for use of narcotics
once they became popular with minorities.
Media accounts and inaccurate data influenced public opinion about opium smoking. “Ambivalence and outright hostility” toward Chinese coupled with the concern
that opium smoking was spreading to the upper classes, provided the foundation for the
passage of the 1909 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act. “Yellow Peril” was a term used in
the years between the Great Wars to express the fear that the huge population of the
Far East posed a military threat to the West. This fear induced an aversion to the
opium usage believed to be prevalent in Chinese communities and foisted anti-opium
legislation.
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Judge Cahill’s analysis also includes a discussion of the impact of unconscious racism on power dynamics and the perception of crime in
this society.196 He traces the manner in which racial messages and
racialized thinking operate in an unconscious manner in American society and likens it to a psychological disease.197 Judge Cahill asserts
that unconscious racism is patently evident in the crack statutes and
infers that Congress’ attempt to rationalize the sentencing disparity
between crack and powder cocaine is evidence of unconscious
racism.198
Following the requirements for evaluating evidence of discriminatory intent articulated in Davis and Arlington Heights, Judge Cahill
sets out to show that the circumstantial evidentiary sources the Supreme Court has offered in these decisions support the unconstitutionality of crack laws.199 He carefully goes through the
Congressional record to show not only that little thought was given to
the construction of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, but also that the
racialization of crack cocaine abuse through mass media and popular
perception greatly influenced Congress’ thinking.200
Congress claimed neutral objectives for incorporating the sentencing disparities into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. Congress
enhanced penalties for cocaine base offenses because crack cocaine:
The Harrison Act of 1914, the first federal law to prohibit distribution of cocaine
and heroin, was passed on the heels of overblown media accounts depicting heroinaddicted Black prostitutes and criminals in the cities.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
196. Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 778-79.
197. Id. at 778-79.
[T]he root of racism has been implanted in our collective unconscious and has biased
the ideas that Americans accept about the significance of race. Racism goes beyond
prejudicial discrimination and bigotry. It arises from outlooks, stereotypes, and fears of
which we are vastly unaware. Our historical experience has made racism an integral
part of our culture even though society has more recently embraced an ideal that rejects racism as immoral. When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas
and the social ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from his
awareness.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The illustration of unconscious racism is patently evident in the crack cocaine statutes.
Had the same type of law been applied to powder cocaine, it would have sentenced
droves of young whites to prison for extended terms. Before the enactment of such a
law, it would have been much more carefully and deliberately considered. After all, in
these days when “toughness on crime” is a political virtue, the simplest and fairest
solution would have been to make the severe punishment for powder cocaine the same
as for crack cocaine. But when the heavy punishment is inflicted only upon those in the
weak and unpopular minority community, it is an example of benign neglect arising
from unconscious racism.
Id.
198. See id. at 779-80.
199. See id. at 783.
200. See id. at 783-87.
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(1) has a more rapid onset of action; (2) is more potent; (3) is more
highly addictive; (4) is less expensive than cocaine powder; and (5) has
widespread availability.201 Congress failed to vet the bill through the
normal committee process, and Judge Cahill aptly employs the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of forseeability as an appropriate
evidentiary measure to prove discriminatory intent, using the very
words of Congressional members.202 He presents compelling statistics
from official and reputable sources about the impact of mandatory
minimums on the Black male population; for instance, Judge Cahill
quoted a Federal Bureau of Prisons report finding a direct relation
between the 90% increase in the prison population during the previous years and the mandatory minimum drug sentences and the sentencing guidelines.203
Finding the racial intent in the Congressional debates surrounding the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 involves decoding
the way in which race is discussed in the post-segregation era.204 The
irony of Judge Cahill having to consider the coded Congressional debates behind the crack statutes is that the Davis intent requirement,
against which his opinion would be measured, was in many ways both
the result and the embodiment of racial coding.
After pursuing a lengthy and thorough analysis, Judge Cahill
found the disparity in crack and cocaine sentencing unconstitutional
by relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.205
In Yick Wo, the court stated that the effect of a law may be so harsh or
adverse in its weight against a particular race that an intent to discriminate is not only a permissible inference, but a necessary one.206 After
a clear showing that Congress deviated from normal procedural pat201. See, e.g., Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 72-91 (2d Sess. 1986); see also 132 CONG. REC. S8092
(daily ed. June 20, 1986) (statement of Sen. D’Amato); 132 CONG. REC. H22,991 (1986) (statement of Rep. Dorgan).
202. See Clary, 846 F. Supp. at 785.
203. See id. at 786.
204. See 132 CONG. REC. S8291 (1986); Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-Coding”
Colorblind Slurs During The Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611
(2000).
205. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
206. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 787 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
Clary argues that the statistical disparity is overwhelming proof of discrimination, and
that in cases where statistical evidence of disparity is “stark,” statistics alone have been
accepted as the sole source of proof of an equal protection violation. This Court agrees
that the statistical evidence of disparate impact resulting from crack cocaine sentences
is compelling. In one of the first in a long line of cases which interpreted the equal
protection clause, the Supreme Court ruled that the effect of a law may be so harsh or
adverse in its weight against a particular race that an intent to discriminate is not only a
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terns; failed to have a rational, thorough discussion of the impact of
crack; and reacted in a frenzy initiated by racially-charged media accounts, Judge Cahill issued a finding of discriminatory intent in the
construction of the crack laws.207 Upon finding a constitutionally impermissible discriminatory classification, Judge Cahill applied the
strict scrutiny standard of review rather than a rational basis standard
to invalidate the federal sentencing scheme.208 Judge Cahill ultimately
sentenced the defendant, Clary, to four years for his drug charges.209
Judge Cahill satisfied the Supreme Court’s requirement that in
order for a constitutional challenge to a facially neutral statute to succeed, the racially discriminatory governmental action must “ultimately
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”210 In Arlington
Heights, the Court itself stated that the presence of a racially disparate
impact demands “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”211 Judge Cahill is careful
to go step-by-step in making the case that the crack statutes violate
basic equal protection principles. He keeps his argument and analysis
well within the bounds of equal protection jurisprudence, and rational
presentations of the conditions surrounding the passage of the crack
statutes. However, despite Judge Cahill’s detailed analysis, the Eighth
Circuit overturned his decision and found the crack statute
constitutional.212
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion is instructive for understanding the
degree to which racialized notions of crime and control are embedded
within the mainstream mind and the stubbornness of the colorblind
logic in contemporary considerations of race. Furthermore, it is illustrative of the commitment to legitimizing a grossly racist system under
transparently racist, but facially neutral policies, a mission that Davis
and its logic works to facilitate. The court’s arguments are flimsy and
reactionary at best and, without providing an in-depth critique of the
Clary case, few points stand out.213 For instance, the court questions
permissible inference, but a necessary one. This appears to be the effect of the crack
statute challenged in this court.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
207. Id. (referring to the evidentiary sources of proper inquiry the Court articulated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
208. Id. at 797.
209. Id.
210. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229, 240 (1976).
211. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
212. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 1994).
213. For more discussion on Clary, see Melissa C. Brown, Equal Protection in a Mean World:
Why Judge Cahill Was Right in United States v. Clary, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
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Judge Cahill’s reliance on media-created stereotypes influencing the
legislative process.214 The court states that “although the placement
of newspaper and magazine articles in the Congressional Record indicates that this information may have affected at least some legislators,
these articles hardly demonstrate that the stereotypical images ‘undoubtedly’ influenced the legislators’ racial perceptions.”215 Judge
Cahill, however, does not merely infer that media accounts of crack
influenced legislators; rather, he makes the logical connection between verifiable media accounts connecting race and crack, and various comments from several editions of the Congressional Record
revealing a discourse rife with racialized references to the crack
epidemic.216
The Eighth Circuit’s analysis is confusing, however, for the court
relies on Congressional testimony citing the dangers of crack cocaine,
but ignores the comments in the Congressional record that reflect the
influence of racial stereotypes.217 According to the Eighth Circuit, on
the one hand, Congress’ contemplation of the crack laws is legitimately influenced by testimony on the heightened dangers of crack,
on the other hand, the verifiable existence of racial stereotypes and
misinformation in the Congressional record is not legitimate evidence
of a racist intent in the development of the crack laws. Additionally,
the court never resolves the unexplained relationship between the unPOL’Y 307 (1997) and Jason A. Gillmer, Note, United States v. Clary: Equal Protection and the
Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 497 (1995).
214. See Clary, 34 F.3d at 713-14.
215. Id. It is important to note that while Judge Cahill invalidated the crack statute on equal
protection grounds, he still sentenced the defendant to a considerably long time for his drug
offenses. This important note counters any claim that Cahill’s principled and well-reasoned
analysis of the equal protection implications of the crack laws are in any way ideological or
rhetorical cover for what critics may call a lenient approach to drug law enforcement.
216. See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783-84 nn.48-50 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
217. See Clary, 34 F.3d at 712 (“We referred to the Senate hearing on crack, citing statements
by five Senators on the dangers of crack cocaine.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
But see id. at 713.
We also question the court’s reliance on media-created stereotypes of crack dealers and
its conclusion that this information “undoubtedly served as the touchstone that influenced racial perceptions held by legislators and the public as related to the ‘crack epidemic.’ ” Although the placement of newspaper and magazine articles in the
Congressional Record indicates that this information may have affected at least some
legislators, these articles hardly demonstrate that the stereotypical images “undoubtedly” influenced the legislators’ racial perceptions. It is too long a leap from newspaper
and magazine articles to an inference that Congress enacted the crack statute because
of its adverse effect on African American males, instead of the stated purpose of responding to the serious impact of a rapidly-developing and particularly-dangerous form
of drug use.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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quantifiable “more dangerous”218 nature of smoking crack and the
100:1 ratio. Why not a 10:1 ratio? The Eighth Circuit supports its
position by relying on Feeney,219 but only exposes the transparency of
its thinking. The court acknowledges that, per Feeney, “a belief that
racial animus was a motivating factor” is inadequate and that the
equal protection clause is violated “only if that [racially disparate impact] can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”220 The court does
not address, however, Judge Cahill’s detailed analysis of the history of
racism in the criminal justice system, specifically concerning drug sentencing and policy design.221 Judge Cahill’s analysis is well documented and requires few, if any, inferential leaps to find that racial
animus was a motivating factor in the construction of the crack laws.
Perhaps the most insulting and cynical blow to Judge Cahill’s
analysis and the struggle to defeat the crack laws is the Eighth Circuit’s semantic juxtaposition of the terms “racial animus” and “racial
consciousness.” The Court argued that testimony by Eric E. Sterling,
Counsel to the Subcommittee of Criminal Justice in the House of
Representatives at the time the sentencing disparity was passed and
an author of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, on the crack laws
acknowledged the presence of racial consciousness, but not racial animus.222 Judge Cahill’s analysis illustrates how “racial consciousness,”
in the context of an overwhelmingly White male legislative body that
deliberately establishes dramatically different sentences for crimes (1)
known to be committed primarily by Black men and (2) regarding a
218. Clary 34 F.3d at 712 (“[C]rack is more dangerous than cocaine powder because as a
person breathes crack vapor, an almost unlimited amount of the drug can enter the body.”).
219. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
220. Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
221. See generally United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 774-76 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
Almost every major drug has been, at various times in America’s history, treated as a
threat to the survival of America by some minority segment of society. Panic based on
media reports which incited racial fears has been used historically in this country as the
catalyst for generating racially biased legislation. The association of illicit drug use with
minorities and the threat of it “spreading to the higher ranks” is disturbingly similar to
the events which culminated in the “100 to 1” ratio enhancement in the crack statute.
Id. at 775-76 (footnote omitted).
222. See Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
Other testimony before the district court demonstrates the particular lack of support
for the court’s conclusion about Congress’ motivation in passing the statute. The testimony of Eric E. Sterling, Counsel to the Subcommittee of Criminal Justice of the
House of Representatives at the time the statutes in question were passed, is the most
pertinent. Sterling stated that the members of Congress did not have racial animus, but
rather “racial consciousness,” an awareness that the “problem in the inner cities . . . was
about to explode into the White part of the country.” Sterling believed that Congress
wanted the penalties to be applied wherever crack was being trafficked, although Congress was aware that crack was used primarily by minorities.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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drug that carries well-known racial associations, is almost always racial animus. He provides undisputed historical precedents and references to support that position and justifies why, given this history, we
should be suspicious of the use of racialized images in such a setting.
The Eighth Circuit’s hair-splitting disrespects the constitutional issues
in contention and is indicative of the court’s dismissive attitude towards the interplay between race, crime, and punishment.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision, however, ironically reflects the unconscious racism, which Judge Cahill references, and the Eighth Circuit quickly dismisses.223 Eric Sterling’s testimony that there was
racial “consciousness” rather than racial “animus” lends further support to the workings of unconscious racism, particularly given Mr.
Sterling’s credibility on this issue and undeniably laudable activist
work towards repealing these laws.224 Whether there is any qualitative difference between racial “animus” and racial “consciousness”
must be considered in the context of the racial history preceding the
moment and the racial atmosphere surrounding the moment. Given
the well documented racialized discourse on drug abuse in the early
1980s, the attention given the issue as a result of the back-to-back
deaths of two prominent Black sports figures, and the relatively brief
period of racial progress leading up to 1986, it is more than possible
that there was no meaningful difference between racial animus and
223. See Clary, 34 F.3d at 713.
224. Mr. Sterling, an author of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, is currently president of
the nonprofit Criminal Justice Policy Foundation and has written and lobbied extensively for the
repeal of the 100-to-1 ratio. He has vocally expressed his regret for authoring the bill and has
called it a “terrible mistake.” Criticisms of his distinctions between racial consciousness and
racial animus in his testimony are made with all due respect to his noteworthy activist work on
this issue. I do feel, however, that such a rationale ultimately sidesteps an opportunity to confront the racial history that framed the passage of the law and the well documented history of
race in the on-going discourse on drug abuse. While it is possible that Mr. Sterling felt that
injecting race into the issue would hinder the greater goal of repealing the law, diminishing the
role of race in discussions on drug abuse and control in the 1980s is counterproductive to confronting the reality of racialized mass imprisonment. Mr. Sterling stands by his contention that
racial animus was absent from any consideration of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
Drug sentences are on the national agenda again because civil rights supporters
are justifiably outraged that almost all federal crack prosecutions involve people of
color. And indeed, for years no Whites were prosecuted for crack offenses in many
federal courts, including those in Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, Denver, Dallas or
Boston.
Because of that, the myth developed that Congress intended to punish Blacks—
believed to be the crack users—with long sentences and let the White powder cocaine
sniffers of Hollywood and Wall Street get away with light sentences. But that’s not the
case. Congress was trying to remedy a problem it believed afflicted the [B]lack
community.
Sterling, supra note 138 (emphasis added). Mr. Sterling’s sympathetic view of Congress’ intentions lacks credibility given the history preceding the law’s passage and its devastating effects.
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consciousness in the 1986 Congressional debates on how to punish
drug abuse. But racial stereotypes in the Congressional record and an
exhaustive history of racialized approaches to criminal justice policy
are unconvincing to the Eighth Circuit because of their essential role
in shaping contemporary theories of just desserts—who deserves what
in terms of crime and punishment—relative to the plight of poor urban Blacks. The rationale employed by the Eighth Circuit to reject
Judge Cahill’s analysis, whether consciously or unconsciously, stems
from a worldview that begins with the construction of Blacks—especially poor urban Blacks—as instinctively prone to criminality if not
inherently criminal. In the court’s mind, it seems, the rationale employed to construct and pass the crack laws is a secondary consideration to their belief that the predominately Black crack cocaine users
were criminals of a distinctly different nature than the predominately
White cocaine users and consequently were deserving of the harshest
penalties.
The Davis Court expressed policy concerns in its presentation of
the slippery slope upon which a disparate impact test could lead. Policy concerns are also likely at the core of the Eighth Circuit’s thinking
in Clary. To hold that crack and powder cocaine sentencing should be
equalized results in dramatic changes for the criminal justice system,
and the racial make-up of its population. As the Eighth Circuit enlists
Davis and its progeny to defend the Congressional record surrounding
the passage of the crack laws, it appears that the crack laws were the
opportunity the intent requirement was designed to serve. Relating
Davis to Plessy exposes the replay of a detrimental history and illustrates the pitfalls of the intent requirement as spelled out in Davis.
The Clary case is the most comprehensive judicial record of the
racialized intent at the core of the crack-versus-cocaine disparity.
Clary was decided before the Sentencing Commission recommended
that the disparities of the crack laws be abolished, a recommendation
not only ignored by Congress and President Clinton, but opposed directly through legislation.225 The Eighth Circuit’s refusal to seriously
225. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 4 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/crack/execsum.pdf (The
Commission recommended that “Congress revisit the 100-to-1 quantity ratio as well as the penalty structure for simple possession.”). “The joint effort by Congress and President Clinton in
passing legislation to kill the Sentencing Commission’s recommendations was the first time in
the Commission’s seven-year history that Congress and the White House blocked one of its
recommendations.” Gillmer, supra note 213, at 502 n.31 (citing Ann Devroy, Clinton Retains
Tough Law on Crack Cocaine: Panel’s Call to End Disparity in Drug Sentencing is Rejected,
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engage Judge Cahill’s analysis, its manipulation of the terms of the
debate as opposed to honestly examining the evidence presented, and
its selective analysis of the evidence presented, amounts to an unabashed indifference to the injustice surrounding the crack laws and
their disparate impact on Blacks.
CONCLUSION
If it is true that history ultimately repeats itself, and the relationship between Plessy and Davis illustrates this, then there is hope for
the Black community and American democracy in the face of racialized mass imprisonment. Like the immediate aftermath of Plessy, the
immediate aftermath of Davis saw the development of laws to operationalize its logic. The crack laws, among others, perform this role.
But the challenges to the crack laws and racialized mass imprisonment
in general are unrelenting, and support for them has recently become
bi-partisan.
In December of 2001, Republican Senators Orin Hatch and Jeff
Sessions introduced the Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2001, which
would have reduced the powder versus crack cocaine sentencing disparity from 100-to-1 to 20-to-1.226 In 2002, Congress conducted hearings in conjunction with the Sentencing Commission’s third report
recommending changes to the 100-to-1 sentencing disparity. In its report, the Commission stated that it “firmly and unanimously believes
that the current federal cocaine sentencing policy set is unjustified and
fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth by Congress in both
the Sentencing Reform Act and the 1986 Act.”227 The Commission
noted that the prevailing beliefs when the laws were passed—that
crack was more addictive and was associated with more violent
crimes—were exaggerated. The Department of Justice, however, expressed strong support for the existing ratio and no action was
taken.228
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at A1.); see also John Lewis & Robert Wilkins, Fix Sentencing Guidelines: Move to End Disparity Along Racial Lines Hasn’t Worked, ATL. J. CONST., Dec. 16, 2004,
at 19A.
226. See S. 1874, 107th Cong. (2001).
227. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 91 (2002).
228. See RYAN S. KING & MARC MAUER, SENTENCING WITH DISCRETION: CRACK COCAINE
SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER 10 (2006).
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The Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Booker229 and
United States v. Fanfan230 are the latest chapters in the more than
twenty-year history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts and their unprecedented consequences. In the decisions, the Supreme Court dealt a
blow to mandatory minimums. Consequently, federal judges have
used the broader discretion afforded by Booker and Fanfan to reject
the 100:1 ratio and call out its racially biased outcomes.231 While
many federal judges continue to employ the rationale of the crack
laws, evidence shows that courts are more willing to grant the various
factors of an offender’s record equal deference in arriving at an appropriate sentence.232 Congress is expected to revisit the sentencing disparity under Congressman John Conyers’ chairmanship of the House

229. 2005 U.S. LEXIS 628 (2005).
The question presented in both of these cases is whether an application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. In each case, the courts held
that binding rules set forth in the Guidelines limited the severity of the sentence that
the judge could lawfully impose on the defendant based on the facts found by the jury
at his trial. In both cases the courts rejected, on the basis of our decision in Blakely v.
Washington, the Government’s recommended application of the Sentencing Guidelines
because the proposed sentences were based on additional facts that the sentencing
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence. We hold that both courts correctly
concluded that the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id. at *15.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 780 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“[N]one of
the previously offered reasons for the 100:1 ratio withstand scrutiny. Perhaps most troubling,
however, is that the unjustifiably harsh crack penalties disproportionately impact on Black defendants. Blacks comprise between 80% and 90% of federal crack cocaine defendants, compared to just 20% to 30% of powder cocaine offenders.”) (footnote omitted). Even in this
opinion, however, the judge reinforces the notion that in passing this grossly discriminatory policy, Congress did not act with discriminatory motives.
Before the guidelines took effect, White federal defendants received an average sentence of 51 months and Blacks an average of 55 months. After the guidelines took
effect, the average sentence for Whites dropped to 50 months, but the average sentence
for Blacks increased to 71 months. Although there is no indication that the legislators
intended that the law have a discriminatory effect, . . . [i]f the impact of the law is discriminatory, the problem is no less real regardless of the intent.
Id. (emphasis added, internal citations and quotations omitted); Simon v. United States, 361 F.
Supp. 2d 35, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
The current focus on a ratio to account for the additional dangers crack posed meant
that “all crack cocaine offenders would be punished as if they engaged in certain more
harmful conduct, even though sentencing data demonstrates that the overwhelming
majority of federal crack cocaine offenders are not involved in such conduct.” The
“intrinsic harms posed by the two drugs (e.g., addictiveness)” and crack’s heightened
association with systemic crime did, however, justify some degree of difference in base
offense levels, which could be reflected in a less severe ratio.
Simon, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
232. See generally King & Mauer, supra note 228.
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Judiciary Committee.233 Congressman Conyers, a long-time critic of
mandatory minimum sentences, favors treating both drugs equally.234
Legal challenges to the crack laws are unrelenting. On February
20, 2007, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Claiborne v.
United States to determine whether a sentence for a low-level crack
cocaine offense below the federal guideline range is “reasonable” and
whether a sentence that varies substantially from the guidelines can be
imposed in extraordinary circumstances.235
The logic of the Davis decision and the intent requirement it produced ultimately responds to the question of whether the challenges
presented by the social upheavals of the 1950s and 1960s will be addressed through a deepening commitment to substantive equality or
whether the resistance to their mandates will be rationalized through
continued social and economic isolation and disenfranchisement. Decisions like the Eighth Circuit’s in Clary illustrate the conscious and
unconscious ways in which systems of racial subjugation are preserved, and the ultimate evil of the intent requirement is dramatized
by its use as a tool to maintain the overtly racist policies supporting
racialized mass imprisonment. As such, the crack laws and the rationales sustaining their continued use should be viewed with the same
contempt as we have come to regard the “three fifths clause” and
“separate but equal.” However, until the weight of Davis and the political and social context within which it is set is popularly understood,
separate but equal will continue to live on and hide behind a cloak of
equality and false neutrality.

233. See Lynette Clemetson, Congress is Expected to Revisit Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2007.
234. See id.
235. Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing List, available at http://www.supremecourt
us.gov/oral_arguments/hearinglists/hearinglist_feb07.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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